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A rapid economic boom in the past decade has completely transformed 
China’s urban landscape into a theme park of skyscrapers. Architecture has 
become a means to showcase ambition and desire. Architects are forced 
to fit into a prescribed way of thinking and assist a powerful government 
to realize its vision of a utopian order. And as such, many of them are 
deprived of opportunities to thoroughly investigate the social issues that 
are affecting China’s urban development. Quite often, architects fall prey 
to political constraints and economic challenges. Despite China being 
a testing ground for handsome architecture and experimental urban 
planning, it is at the same time a graveyard of ethical architectural practices. 
In response to such pervasive conditions of architectural practice, this 
thesis investigates social and cultural issues in China that are beyond the 
control and repertoire of an architect; but ones that directly affect the 
development of this fast-modernizing nations.
 Across the dynasties, a unique walled culture was developed in 
the Chinese society, characterized by its emphasis on inward orientation 
and boundary making. The Ming dynasty reached the maturity of this 
walled culture when political hierarchy, strict morality and the obsession 
of wall building dominated society in an extreme fashion. It was during 
the Ming dynasty that the Great Wall was substantially extended in length. 
Inside the limits of this national boundary, the emperor enclosed each 
city itself within massive walled networks. In this way, the wall became 
a physical symbol of Chinese centrality and insularity, where massive 
walls, strict order and a focus on morality all worked together to create 
a physically and psychologically suffocating cultural atmosphere. Within 
this walled culture, a growing fear of a centralized bureaucratic power and a 
subsequent repression placed upon political criticism were commonplace. 
 Today, almost five centuries after-the-fact, there remains a ghost 
of this former walled culture. Although most of these ancient symbols 
of physical control—the walls themselves—have fallen in ruin after the 
collapse of dynastical China, an invisible, psychological wall still remains in 
Chinese society to restrict any politically incorrect thoughts. The collective 
mind of contemporary China is struggling between the will of rapid 
modernization and the desire for free expression. The notion of ‘going 
modern’ and developing an advanced lifestyle now forms a kind of mutual 
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consent between the government and the citizens. In order to enjoy their 
‘modern’ lifestyles, contemporary Chinese must acknowledge and respect 
certain limits—they must always act and think for the collective good as 
determined by the government. The government sees suppression of free 
expression and covering up of social injustice as the best way to ensure 
social stability and centralization of power. It is for this reason that the 
ancient walls of China have gradually transformed into a psychological 
wall that haunts the mind of the citizens.  From this perspective, the wall 
never really collapsed or became ruins—it still resides in the psychology of 
the collective.  
 The concept of wall, physical and metaphorical, is the central 
theme of this thesis. It is not only to be understood as the physical realization 
of a superficial idea of protection, separation and control, but also as the 
dominant mechanism of repression, an invisible wall that continues to 
shape the Chinese national psyche today. This thesis attempts to reveal and 
confront the unspoken meaning of the wall in Chinese culture which has 
been buried under the glamour of national pride and glory. It presents a 
yearning to transform a wall that covers up injustice and inequality into a 
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 Just like there are two sides to every wall, in China, walls have a 
double meaning. They are not only understood physically as a means of 
protection, separation, and control, but also as a dominant mechanism of 
repression, a significant psychological barrier that continues to shape the 
Chinese psyche today. This thesis is a “personal recollection” of thoughts and 
ideas, using the concept of walls, physical and metaphorical, as the central 
theme. Every drawing, photo and act of writing represents a personal and 
alternate view to the struggles of a changing modern Chinese society under 
the shadow of the Wall.
 The motivation behind this thesis is born out of two struggles: 
(1) my personal quest as a Chinese female who grew up in the West to 
understand the subconsciousness of the Chinese society; (2) the struggles of 
China to become modernized. 
(1) My struggles
I consider myself a hybrid—a person of mixed cultural identities; I have no 
fixed identity. I was born in the former British colony of Hong Kong, and 
have grown up in a generation that cares less about cultural identity and 
more about material pleasure, individual success, and quality of life. Ever 
since I can remember, none of my childhood friends considered themselves 
as Chinese, but Hong Kong citizens; I had never even considered China as 
my homeland, and had negligible knowledge and concern for China. When 
I lived in Hong Kong, China was considered a lesser place than Hong Kong. 
It resembled poverty, backwardness, and a lack of civilization. 
 My Chinese identity grew stronger after I moved to Canada at the 
age of twelve, where, I was categorized as Chinese Canadian. Hong Kong 
was returned to China in 1997 and I could no longer deny my Chinese 
identity. China’s rapid economic growth in the late twentieth century 
attracted the attention of Western media. I came across different articles 
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about China’s urban transformation and new architecture. It was exciting 
to be an architecture student, to read stories about China’s emergence as an 
architectural playground. China seemed to provide great opportunities for 
architects to realize their innovative designs. Therefore, I decided to research 
China for my thesis. I chose China’s walls as my research topic because 
China has often been referred to as a “walled culture.” And so I began with 
the surviving city wall in Nanjing City in the Jiangsu Province.  
 In the fall of 2005, I set off for Nanjing, the former six-time capital 
city of China, to photodocument the condition of its ancient city wall. I 
wanted to find what the wall now meant in contemporary China. Since 
the early twenty-first century, the municipal government has relocated 
thousands of local citizens to make way for the city wall’s  billion-dollar 
restoration and reconstruction project. When I was there, most sections of 
the city wall had been turned into parks. Looking at the masonry workers 
laying newly-cut bricks onto the wall structure under bamboo scaffolding, 
and others applying fresh coats of paint onto the timber tower rebuilt at the 
reconstructed city gate, I wondered about the ultimate value of this fake 
antique for local citizens.
 During my journey, I encountered another wall besides that of the 
wall of brick and mortar. This wall resided solely in the mind of citizens and 
it existed because of fear. I encountered a succession of events in Nanjing 
that confirmed the presence of this psychological wall in the collective 
mind: I witnessed two vicious authoritative campus patrols in military-green 
uniform tearing down students’ Halloween party posters at the University of 
Nanjing; I flipped through a self-censored book of architecture1; and I was 
told about the anonymous emails, presumably from the local government, 
warning Nanjing citizens not to participate in the nationwide protest against 
the revised Japanese history textbook. These experiences cast shadows in my 
memory and I gave myself a grand but naïve mission after the trip: to set 
the citizens free from decades of suppression of free thinking. But how? This 
issue is complex and cannot be solved simply through architecture.
 The Nanjing City Wall has always been a political tool since 
it was first built in the Ming Dynasty. At first, the wall was a realization 
of an authoritarian political system which was centralized, insular, and 
conservative. Today, the city wall represents a cultural heritage and national 
pride. The idea of reconstructing the wall to glorify the past is anathema to 
me. I brainstormed possibilities that would transform the Nanjing City Wall 
from a monument to a culturally stimulating structure—a place that would 
allow individuals to explore and reinterpret their own meaning of the past. I 
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wanted to reconnect this urban artefact, which was being mummified, to the 
dynamic development of the city. I wanted to let the memory of the city wall 
continue to evolve beyond that of the Ming dynasty. I wanted to transform 
the city wall from something concrete (a dead monument) into an inspiring 
journey that would allow people to see the wall beyond its physical form and 
to rethink the relationship between space, memory, and body.  I wanted the 
people to think beyond the wall. Borrowing from Cedric Price’s concept of 
urban magnets, the wall should not be an end, but instead encourage the 
continual necessity for change.2 
 I imagined I could break through the city wall and create a 
picturesque stroll through the wall like Richard Serra’s “Clara-Clara.” I 
imagined the journey to be composed of a succession of views and moments. 
People walked into the wall to experience different sculptural spaces through 
bodily movement and sensation. The city wall itself became a sculpture. 
The experience of walking inside the wall would be personal, variable, and 
contingent, reliant on how people experienced the space. 
 I imagined I could transform the city wall from a solid mass into a 
virtual wall of mist. I imagined the city wall as an outdoor public bath house, 
a place of social gathering. The idea of transforming architecture from a 
political object into a communal, utilitarian space was fascinating to me.  
 I imagined I could transform the city wall into a “democracy wall”3 
where everyone, including the dissidents, could project their long-repressed 
thoughts and opinions about the society onto the surface of the wall. The 
people could gather to exchange thoughts without worrying about strict 
policing.  There would be a library to archive the opinions and stories of the 
people in audio format. There would be temporary exhibitions and forums 
held on the city wall. I imagined people singing and dancing through the 
wall. I imagined freedom of expression re-emerging on the wall. 
 I kept on imagining.
 Those thoughts and imaginings became overwhelming, emotional, 
intense, and abstract. I did not have the courage to put all these thoughts 
down onto paper and translate them into physical spaces. Architecture 
became meaningless. Do the people in China want these spaces? Am I adding 
another theme park to the city? Who am I? Do I have the right to represent 
their concerns? I was lost and confused; I could not set my mind free. Walls 
began to build within me.
 I could not convince myself of a proper program and design 
intention. I began to question why I wanted to touch upon such a political 
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issue. I was born into a family in which politics was a taboo. I realized my 
background knowledge of China was weak. I began to read Chinese history 
and to read about contemporary issues. The more I understood, the more 
helpless I felt as an architecture student. I am living in a generation in which 
history becomes insignificant in the shaping of contemporary Chinese 
cities; erasure of the past becomes common practice. I felt overwhelmed 
by the sweeping destruction of decaying traditional neighbourhoods to 
accommodate new wealth. But I could understand the eagerness of the 
contemporary Chinese and why they would consider the traditional past 
as impediments to development. They had had enough of poverty. A rapid 
economic boom in the past decade has completely transformed China’s 
urban landscape into a theme park of skyscrapers. Architecture has become 
a means to showcase ambition and desire. Architects are forced to fit into 
a prescribed way of thinking and assist a powerful government to realize 
its vision of a utopian order. And as such, many of them are deprived of 
opportunities to thoroughly investigate the social issues that are affecting 
China’s urban development. Quite often, architects fall prey to political 
constraints and economic challenges. Despite China being a testing ground 
for handsome architecture and experimental urban planning, it is at the same 
time a graveyard of ethical architectural practices. 
 Therefore I decided to investigate issues that are beyond the control 
and repertoire of an architect; but ones that directly affect the development 
of architecture and a city.
(2) Struggles of Modern China
River of Temptation and Wall of Suppression.
In 2006, Chinese officials celebrated the completion of the Three Gorges 
Dam, a colossal engineering project holding back the Yangtze River. The 
dam is five times as wide as the Hoover Dam. Its reservoir stretches for about 
660 kilometres, and the dam’s twenty-six turbines are expected to generate 
18,000 megawatts of hydroelectricity a year. The human and environmental 
costs for the over twenty-five billion dollar project were enormous. Millions 
of people have been forced to relocate, many of them farmers. Artefacts dating 
back 2000 years were lost and submerged in water. Drinking water in some 
areas became contaminated, not to mention other hidden environmental 
devastation. Nonetheless, all of these losses and opposing voices have been 
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put aside and blocked by a Great Wall of pride, satisfying China’s insatiable 
appetite for energy, wealth, and fame. 
 The struggles of the Three Gorges Dam project are a microcosmic 
demonstration of modern China’s struggles. If the river represents a kind of 
ambition that is dangerous and unpredictable, modern China is willing to 
take the risk to try and control it. Ancient Chinese venerated the mighty 
Yellow and Yangtze Rivers. The annual great flood destroyed their settlements 
and threatened their lives, but this still couldn’t stop the Chinese from 
approaching the rivers. They depended on the rivers to encourage fertile 
soil for farming—the rivers give them the chance for a better life. Similarly, 
lightning modernization by all means is risky, yet tempting to contemporary 
Chinese. The humiliating collapse of the Chinese dynastical empire and the 
social instabilities of the twentieth century make contemporary Chinese 
believe in rapid progress and big ambition at all costs. They acknowledge the 
potential risks, but they choose to ignore them. A strong government with 
boundless authority put up the Great Wall of national pride and unity to 
cover up follies, injustice and inequality. 
 In the past two decades, the notion of “going modern” and 
developing a materialistic lifestyle has formed a silent, but mutual consent 
between the Chinese government and its citizens. In order to enjoy their 
“modern” lifestyle, contemporary Chinese citizens must acknowledge and 
respect certain rules and limits – they must always act and think for the 
collective good as determined by the government. However, the government 
sees suppression of individual expression as the best way to fit society into 
a prescribed way of thinking and to protect the society from unwanted 
influence. Confucius had said “The essence of the gentleman is that of wind; 
the essence of small people is that of grass. And when wind blows over the 
grass, grass cannot choose but bend.”4 In the case of China, the authoritarian 
power is the wind, the citizens are the grass. The essence of the ancient 
Chinese walls has remained and continues to haunt the mind of modern 
citizens. From this perspective, the wall of the Chinese psyche has yet to 
collapse; instead, it is entrenched in the collective mind.
This thesis is a compilation of thoughts and ideas, like a notebook, filled with 
frustrations and concerns over China’s struggles. It attempts to reveal and 
confront the unspoken meaning of the wall in Chinese culture which has 
been buried under the glamour of national pride and glory. 
 The first section, “Walking around the Wall,” presents a selection 
of photos documenting the Nanjing City Wall, as well as presenting an 
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alternate view. My trip to Nanjing inspired me to begin this thesis on the 
reinterpretation of the meaning of wall in the Chinese culture.
 Part II, “Nanjing City Wall and Autocracy,” focuses on the physical 
and psychological implications of the Nanjing City Wall. The three significant 
manipulations of the Nanjing city wall—construction, de-construction and 
re-construction—reflect the political motives behind different autocratic 
regimes in Chinese history. Centralization of political power has always been 
the main catalyst behind the three chapters of the Nanjing City Wall. In 
each case, the collective mind has always been dominated by the will of a 
single ruler. It is not difficult to discover a collective psychological barrier, 
an invisible wall created by a mixture of fear, ignorance, desperation, power-
worship, blind fervour, social hysteria, and self-censorship. 
 In Part III, “Nation and Boundary,” the writings concentrate on the 
ancient Chinese concept of national boundary, looking in particular at the 
Great Wall of China. This northern frontier has been used to reinforce unity 
of the Chinese nation ranging from the dynastic periods’ goal of physically 
protecting the Chinese civilization against their nomadic neighbours to 
the north to the Communist era’s manipulation of the Wall as a symbol of 
national pride. Wall building and the concept of unity have intertwined to 
create the Chinese identity, yet Chinese have a mix of love and hate for the 
Great Wall. On one hand, the Great Wall unified the nation. On the other 
hand, the insularity of the Wall also brought the downfall of the nation. 
 Part IV, “Wall of Pride and Sorrow,” juxtaposes the officially 
mandated utopia with the gloomy realities of the contemporary Chinese 
society in two photo collections. As lives of people from different social 
strata become more complex and divergent in the past two decades, there 
is hardly any single photo that can depict a complete picture of Chinese 
society. Wealthy citizens pursuing trendy clothing and driving luxurious 
cars are real, but so are black-market slaves working in remote coal mines 
and AIDS victims struggling with local authorities to get their stories told. 
When we attempt to understand the reality of what modern China is, we are 
forced to look at both pride and tragedies. A utopia where everyone lives a 
harmonious and perfect life is indeed a perfect contrast to reality. 
 In Part V, “the Yearnings,” we first look at the driving force 
behind China’s walled culture, Confucianism, which is based on ritual 
and self-control, and how it has been adulterated and manipulated by 
the authoritarian government to denounce individualism, evolution, and 
political transparency. The second part of this section analyses the effects 
of the walled culture on China’s national psychology through the voices of 
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contemporary social critics and writers in the early twentieth century: Lu 
Xun in the 1920s; Bo Yang in the 1960s; Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang 
in the mid-1980s. These intellectuals attempted to voice the problems of 
national character and all shared one common yearning: emancipation of 
their fellow citizens from the legacy of the walled culture. 
 The final section, “Levelling the Wall Within,” is a personal 
yearning that urges for change. It begins with a classical experiment on 
learned helplessness that relates to the state of China’s collective psychology 
after cycles of social upheaval and suppression of free thinking, especially 
during the last century. Creating a picture of utopia by silencing opposing 
voices, covering up social problems, and sacrificing individual rights may 
harm future social development. Drawing on discussions of struggles 
against oppression in modern China, the final section argues that a true 
modern society comes from its ability to absorb diversity and differences 
and to acknowledge injustices. Foucault’s concept of heterotopia provides a 
theoretical framework for approaching an open society based on inclusion 
of differences, contrast and dissent. Opposing voices can be catalysts for 
changes that better a society when they constantly challenge the existing 
social crippleness. Dissidents can provide alternatives to the Chinese “utopia” 
that has been created through strict policing and suppression. Only in a 
politically free environment can individuals develop their voice and walk 
away from the legacy of a walled culture.  
 The three art installations—the River Case, the Land Case and the 
Consecrated Site—that appear between chapters are projects from the M1 
studio. They explore themes such as emotion, identity and commemoration 
that inspired me to begin my interpretation of the meaning of walls in the 
Chinese culture. 
 This thesis made me aware of my hybrid cultural identity which 
provides me the flexibility and detachment to see this world as a global 
citizen. My education in a free country gives me the open-mindedness to 
investigate my cultural roots beyond the limits of national boundaries, and 
most importantly, to establish my own voice in the quest of making new 
borders of identity.
To the east lives a Prole, to the west a Fascist, but I don’t care of 
any of this stuff. If I’m forced to state what “ism” I’m for, all I can 
say is that I want to be an individual.
- Lin Yutang, 1934
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I waded, deepening, and the fish
Listened for me. They watched my each move
Through their magical skins. In the stillness
Their eyes waited, furious with gold brightness,
Their gills moved. And in their thick sides
The power waited. And in their torpedo
Concentration, their mouth-aimed intent,
Their savagery waited, and their explosion.
They waited for me. The whole river
Listened to me, and, blind,
Invisibly watched me. And held me deeper
With its blind, invisible hands
“We’ve got him,” it whispered, “We’ve got him.”
- Ted Hughes, “After Moonless Midnight”
The River Case
The two paintings of the Grand River express the alluring dark forces, calm 
and potentially dangerous, as depicted in Ted Hughes’s After Moonless 
Midnight. The explosive desire and anticipation embedded in the poem are 
liberated and expressed in the paintings of the River. The poem and the 




Painting of the Grand River.
Latex Paint on Canvas, 5’x8’.
View of the Grand River, 2005.
by: angela chan
 
  Cambridge, Canada





Painting of the Grand River.
Latex Paint on Canvas, 5’x8’.
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In 2005, I went to Nanjing and walked around 
its city wall where accessible. I walked inside 
and outside the city wall. I climbed on the 
wall. I walked on the former sites of the wall. 
Motion connected with emotion. What I saw 
during my journey constituted a psychological 
geography in my mind. 
Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
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 1.  Zhonghuamen (Zhubaomen)
 2.  Zhonghua West Gate - 1931
 3.  Jiqingmen - 1992
 4.  Shuiximen (Sanshanmen)
 5.  Hanximen (Shichengmen)
 6.  Qingliangmen
 7.  Caochangmen - 1908
 8.  Dinghuaimen




13.  Xiaobeimen - 1931
14.  Zhongyangmen - 1931
15.  Hepingmen (Shenbimen)
16.  Xuanwumen - 1909
17.  Jiefangmen - 1952
18.  Taipingmen
19.  Zhongshanmen (Chaoyangmen)
20.  Guanghumen (Zhenyangmen)
21.  Tongjimen
22.  Wudingmen - 1929
23.  Yuhuamen - 1935


















Gate in Ming dynasty
Gate built after Ming 
dynasty 
23 24 
Map: Nanjing City Wall & Gates
Existing City Wall











 4.  Shuiximen
 5.  Hanzhongmen
 7.  Caochangmen
11.  Zhongningmen
12.  Jinchuanmen
13.  Xiaobeimen 
14.  Zhongyangmen
18.  Taipingmen
20.  Guanghumen 
21.  Tongjimen
22.  Wudingmen 
23.  Yuhuamen 





















Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
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I got lost when I was trying to find the former site of the city wall. The site was hidden behind the shopping 
mall and residential low-rise apartments. I asked the local people for the exact location but no one could tell 
me where the former city wall was located. [10.21.2005]
A1
A2
I could not reach the former site of the city wall. The site was occupied by private properties. The low-rise apartments were like a giant 
habitable wall to me. [10.21.2005]
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Demolition of brick houses dating back from the imperial period took place near the former site of the city wall. [10.21.2005]
When I was crossing a bridge, the two long stretches of green fields along the river 
caught my attention. I thought they were wild vegetation until I saw this old woman 
bending forward to pick vegetables from the field. I was excited and descended a staircase 
to the greenfield below street level. This old woman was taking care of her vegetable 
fields along the river. [10.21.2005]
I tried to start a conversation with her but 
she just smiled at me. Then, I realized she 
was deaf. She was planting her vegetables 




I reached another section of the city wall. It was part 
of the tourist attraction on Shizishan, the Lion Hill. 
The entrance fee into the park was 40 yuans ($8.5 
CND) which included the admission to three “historical” 
buildings, two of which were constructed in early 21st 
century. [10.21.2005]
The city wall was built around into the Lion Hill. The 
rampart was rebuilt with a mix of old and new bricks. 
[10.21.2005]
Yuejiang Lou was the major attraction in this theme 
park. This tower, 52 metres tall, was located at the 
peak of the mountain. The design of the building was 
based on a poem written by Zhu Yuanzhang the first 
emperor of Ming dynasty (1368-1644) who founded 
his capital in Nanjing. Emperor Zhu composed a poem 
to describe his plan to build a tower on the Lion Hill 
to commemorate a successful battle at this site that led 
to the rise of his dynasty. Emperor Zhu’s tower project 
was suspended for 600 years. It was realized in 2001, 
only for tourism. [10.21.2005]
A traditional Chinese pavilion was built along the 







The Yuejiang Lou was an empty shell. Inside the tower was a souvenir 
stall and empty space. The tower was just a backdrop for tourists to take 
pictures. I began to wonder about the value of this building. I left the tower 
with feeling of emptiness and descended down the hill. I arrived at the level 
of the city wall. (Above) I saw these two little houses on the hill side. 
They were not part of the displays in this park. There were vegetable fields 
and clothing hanging in front of the house.  When will these residents be 
relocated and their houses dismantled? [10.21.2005]
(Below) Adjacent to the two houses, construction workers were busy re-
constructing the Yifengmen, the city wall gate that was demolished in the 






Yifengmen in late 1990.
Source: Nanjing Cheng Zhi Hua, 9.
Source: Yang, Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu, 535.
A8
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View of the Xiuqiu Park from the top 
of the city wall. [10.21.2005]
New paving and new landscaping on the city wall. [10.21.2005]
I walked southward from the 
Yifengmen along this path. This path 
would lead me to the Xiuqiu Park. 
Temporary shelters for construction 
workers were placed against the city 
wall. [10.21.2005]
A memorial stone to commemorate 
the victims of the Nanjing Massacre. 
This area was one of the mass burial 







Barbering on the city wall, which was under restoration. [10.21.2005] Street barbering at the foot of 
the gate. The day I visited this 
Yijiangmen, there were also local 
people gathered at the foot of 
the gate playing card games. 
[10.21.2005]




I entered this public park from Yijiangmen. I 
was walking southward along the path outside 
of the city wall. [10.21.2005]
The water was calm. This was once to be a continuous moat that wrapped around the city wall. Today, it had been 





This section of the city wall ended at 
Dinghuaimen. The former site of the city 
wall was occupied by low-rise apartments. 
[10.21.2005]
The former site of the city wall from 
Dinghuaimen to Caochangmen has been 
transformed into a light commercial strip. 
[10.21.2005]
Examples of the retail stores on the 
commercial strip included a camera store, a 
Taiwanese bento box lunch restaurant and an 
art store. [10.21.2005]
On the opposite side of the street, construction workers were busy 





















B16 B17 B18 B19
Route B
Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
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Before I came to Nanjing, I had collected some old photos of the city gate (Bottom) and I 
was particularly impressed by the simple form of the wooden structure on the Heping Gate. 
(Top) Heping Gate was located in a public park. When I was there, the Gate was closed 
for restoration but the security guide let me in to take a few photos.
I walked up the staircase in full anticipation. The staircase led me to the wooden structure I 
had seen from old photos. When I saw the lines of light fixtures that ran around the edge of 
the roof like Christmas lighting, my heart sank to the bottom of the sea. This ancient wooden 
structure had a complete face lift. It looked like a new structure. Its enchanting sense of 
melancholy was gone forever. I began to imagine one day when the Gate was open to the 
public, this wooden structure would forever be turned into a souvenir shop. [10.22.2005]
B1
(Bottom) Source: Yang, Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu, 536 &537.
Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
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I left the park and continued 
to walk around the city wall. 
I did not know where I was 
going. I followed an old man 
and entered another complex of 
low-rise residential apartments.  
They lined up perpendicular to 
the city wall. These apartments 
were located between the moat 
and the city wall. [10.22.2005]
The colorful clothes always 
caught my attention, especially 
when they were bathed under 
the sun. They were like kites, 
flying in the air. They made any 
impoverished areas alive again. 
The end of the road between 
the two rows of apartments was 
the city wall, which was hidden 
behind the trees. [10.22.2005]
I left the residential 
neighbourhood and continued to 
walk along the city wall. I was 
entering an unexpected region. 
From afar I saw the city wall 






(Top) I walked along the unpaved path and entered a vast field open to the sky. The city 
wall on my right was lush green. At the foot of the wall were rows of vegetable fields. Piles 
of small clay pots and rows of green vegetables formed a beautiful picture. [10.22.2005] 
(Middle) A few steps away from the vegetable fields was an open-air dump site. Piles of 
garbage and building materials scattered around and mingled with the wild vegetation. The city 
wall behind was hidden behind the lush green vegetation. [10.22.2005] 
(Bottom) I turned around and shifted my gaze away from the dump site. I saw a poor 
lonely house, sitting against the backdrop of the new luxurious condominiums. I could not 





(Above) There was a gate at the end of the path. I arrived at the north-west bank of the 
Xuanwu Lake. I felt a sense of relief. It was a scenic spot. The willow trees, the glittering 
water, the isles in the lake and the skyscrapers in silhouette formed a beautiful picture. 




(Top) Looking across to the south bank of the Lake, I saw a picture of prosperity. Many 
new skyscrapers were under construction. They were competing in height. This was a familiar 
image of China we come cross in architectural magazines. [10.22.2005]
(Bottom Left) I made a right turn and continued to walk southward along the city wall. A 
Series of banners hung above the path that said, “Everyone is the host of the New Nanjing.” 
(Bottom Middle) On my right, there were rows of private vegetable fields that ran against the 
city wall. (Bottom Right) As I walked along the Lake, I heard a splash. A man had jumped 




(Top) I walked southward along the Lake. At one point, I paused and looked back to the 
north and took this picture. A private tennis court was built against the city wall. Behind the 
wall was a skyscraper. Along the lakeshore, I saw people reading, sketching, doing water-
color painting and chatting with their friends. [10.22.2005]
The trail along the Xuanwu Lake was a pleasant walk but I wanted to explore the other side 
of the city wall. (Bottom) I exited at the Xuanwu Gate and arrived inside the city wall. The 
Xuanwu Gate was the entrance to the Xuanwuhu Park on the four isles in the Lake. I wanted 
to avoid the busy crowd of local tourists so I continued my journey on a local street, south of 




(Top) I was walking along a road called Kunlun Lu. I did not know where would be my 
next destination. The city wall would lead the way. (10.22.2005)
(Middle) These snap shot photos were taken at a residential neighbourhood, which Kunlun 
Lu led me to. There were rows of four storey apartments built along the city wall. The 
neighbourhood was animated by different street activities. (10.22.2005)
(Bottom) Walking further down the road, a blue hoarding wall went up against the city wall. 





(Top Left) I arrived at a site with remnants of dismantled houses. (Top Right) At the same 
site, I turned around and took a picture of the two skyscrapers under construction, which 
presided high over the city wall in the foreground. Scenes of construction and destruction could 
be seen everywhere in the city. [10.22.2005]
(Bottom) When I saw this rundown castle-like building facade, I began to imagine this former 





(Top) I left the depressing site and arrived at the Jiefangmen, translated as Gate of 
Liberation. The Nanjing city wall museum was located here inside the city wall  [10.22.2005]
(Bottom) I was standing on Jiefangmen. The enormous staircase, 5 metres wide, was a new 





I was standing on the Jiefang Gate.
(Top) There was an access to the back-door of a temple on the city wall. [10.22.2005]
(Middle) Snap shot photos taken from the wall of the buildings besides the city wall inside 
the city. [10.22.2005]



























Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
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(Top) South Elevation of the Zhonghuamen, South Gate. Zhonghuamen Gate served historically 
as a compound to confine and trap any invaders through the wall. It measured 128 metres long 
from north to south, 118 metres from east to west and 21.4 metres high (South wall). It sits 
on a pedestrian island surrounded by busy traffics in and out of the city. Two streams of the 
Qinhua River, 24m wide and 120m wide, run along the gate’s north and south side respectively. 




(Bottom Left) Inside the Gate. Zhonghuamen has four arched gateways built in stone and brick. 
Each gateway has a drop-door. Zhonghurmen is a construction of three storeys. The top storey 
of the Gate is a wooden structure which is no longer in existence. (Bottom Middle)The second 
storey has seven tunnels where troops were stationed. The one at the centre was the largest-44.92 
metres in length and 6.84 metres in width. The small tunnels flanking it was each 38.8 metres 
long and 3.9 metres width. The height of all the tunnels is about 6 metres. (Bottom Right)The 
first storey has 6 such tunnels. These tunnels were places where troops were stationed and arms 
were kept in time of war. Today, these tunnels house exhibitions of ancient city wall brick and 





(Top) Looking to the east of Zhonghuamen. The top of the city wall was taken over by nature 
and was inaccessible to the public. A communal park sat along the north side of the wall inside 
the city. The wall cast a shadow onto the park most of the day but it was a popular social 
gathering place.  [10.27.2005] 
(Middle) Looking to the north of Zhonghuamen. [10.27.2005] 
(Bottom) Looking to the south of Zhonghuamen. The Qinhua River runs along this section of the 
city wall. The city was expanded beyond this wall.  [10.27.2005]
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The road cut through the city wall and left an opening at the west side of Zhonghua city wall gate. [10.27.2005]  
The old man in grey sweater was waiting for his bicycle fixed. [10.27.2005]    
(Opposite & the overleaf)
I was told by a resident 
whose home was built on the former site of the city wall (west of Zhonghuamen)
 that the government would relocate them in order to reconstruct the city wall.
I took two pictures of the apartments slated for demolitions:
a bicycle parked in front of the grocery store,
the clothing hanging from the trees,
the barbed wire fence,







 I walked westward into a tunnel underneath a viaduct that cut across the city wall. I walked up a ramp and arrived at a public park.
I ascended a stair and arrived at a sublevel where the city wall was cut. This area was under shade of pine trees. [10.27.2005]





 On top of the city wall, 
I did not walk in a straight line. 
I walked in a zigzag across the top ,
from one side to another. 
The top was about 12 metres wide, 
I leaned over the 1 metre high parapet 
and took pictures of the space adjacent to the city wall. 
Along the wall outside the city was a public park (above)
between the city wall and the moat
Along the wall inside the city were clusters of buildings (below):
courtyard houses,
low-rise apartments,





Houses adjacent to the wall inside the city. [10.27.2005]
A dump site adjacent to the wall inside the city. [10.27.2005]





One end of the city wall on Fengtai Road. [10.30.2005]




Huju Road was built along the 
former site of the city wall.
(10.25.2005)
Looking south on a bridge across Huju Road. [10.20.2005]
Looking north on a bridge across Huju Road. [10.20.2005]





Remnant of the city wall gate in Hanzhong Public Square. [10.20.2005]
C18
The Hanzhong Gate was transformed into a public square called Hanzhong Guangchang as part of the revitalization project of 
the city wall. The project was completed in 1997. [10.25.2005] 
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I left Hanzhong Public Square
and walked northward along Huju Road. 
My next destination was Shitoucheng, 
a popular attraction of the city wall. 
On the way to Stone City, 
I took a few snapshots of the people. These 
images captured the daily life of the people.
[10.25.2005]
 Exit of a highway adjacent to a bicycle lane and retail stores. [10.25.2005]
A simple food store. [10.25.2005]





These pictures were taken from the wall looking out of the city on the section called Shitoucheng. This section of the wall was built on 




A road cut through the city wall. [10.26.2005]




Three to four storeys low-rise apartments were built adjacent to the city wall. [10.26.2005]
C24
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Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
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(Top) A park space outside the city wall. I walked pass a few people who were playing 
taichi, playing chess and doing exercises. That morning, the park was scarcely used. This 
park was formerly occupied by residential brick houses. The residents were relocated in early 
2000 for the restoration of the park. [10.18.2005]
(Bottom) Outside the city wall, I found a landscaped park. Inside the city wall was a 
different world. I found a quiet laneway with simple stores along both sides. They were all 
selling black leather shoes. These stores had no signage but handwritten store number. Rows 
of black leather shoes were lined up in front of each store on the floor. At the end of the 
laneway was a storage building located right next to a low-rise residential apartment complex. 
There were roosters and dogs running around. [10.18.2005]
(Middle) This section of the city wall ended at a street called Jiang Yu Lu. In 1936, a new 
city wall gate called Yuhuamen was opened in this area to make way for a railway which ran 
from north to south. Today, one can no longer find traces of the railway and the city wall 





(Bottom) Behind the city wall where I founded the two gated communities was a public park 
space outside the city wall. A traditional Chinese pavilion was under construction. [10.18.2005]
(Top) I was over-excited when I found this opening inside the city wall without realizing that 
I had entered a private property. This opening was located between two gated communities: 
one of them was a luxurious low-rise residential apartment complex and the other was a run-
down mixed-use apartment. I thought the gate was open to the other side but it was blocked. 





(Above) This section of the public park ended where the 
city wall was cut. The rampart was taken over by nature 
and there was no access to get up to the city wall. 
[10.18.2005]
(Right) The city wall was cut to make way for traffic. The 
road was called Wuding Men and named after the demolished 
former city gate. This wall section became a backdrop for 
a bus stop. There were two laneways along both sides of 
the wall. I first walked along the east side, outside the city 
wall, which led me to a garbage station and a few residential 
neighborhoods. [10.18.2005]   
I began the walk along the city wall. 
A handwritten sign said, “Garbage 
Collection”. [10.18.2005]
The laneway was about 3 
metres wide with no exit. It is 
the only access that linked the 
different residential neighborhoods 
and a few mixed-use building 
complexes. [10.18.2005]
I wondered how many families 
were living in each building 
complex. Was the kid in the 
image already the luckier one 
who had shelter to live in even it 






I walked further down the 
laneway and reached a 
residential neighborhood of 
low-rise apartment. There 
was a public washroom 
against the city wall and 
I wondered why a public 
washroom was located next 
to the residential apartments. 
[10.18.2005]
The end of the laneway I reached a cluster of simple brick houses. They were built by the residents. Since 2000, the 





I walked along the west side of the city wall from Wu Ding Men. The environment 
was different from the east side. The path was newly paved and linked to two 





(Top) I was standing on one end of the city wall. A section of the city wall ended at the 
Tongjimen Park, where the former city wall gate, Tongjji Gate, was located. Looking north, 
upscale condominiums were location along the former site of the city wall  [10.18.2005] 
(Bottom) A view of the Tongjimen Park on the east side of the city wall. Standing on the 
city wall allowed me to see the diversity of social class living around the city wall. One side 
of the wall were some impoverished brick houses and run-down apartment buildings. The 
other side of the city wall were some middle-class low-rise apartments. Along the former site 
of the city wall were the luxurious condominiums complex. [10.18.2005] 





The section of the city wall between the former gates, Tongjimen and Guanghuamen, was 




The Nanjing municipal government made a proposal in 1997 to turn the city wall into 
a green belt. These are the snapshots of the park space between the ctiy wall and 
the moat that I walked along. [10.18.2005] 
Residential apartment built on the former site of city wall [10.18.2005] 






A major boulevard runs through the Zhongshan 
Gate. The gate at the centre is 10 metres 
wide, 10.5 metres high and 15 metres deep. 
The other two gates are 8 metres wide, 9,5 
metres high and 15 metres deep. The three 
gates were made in 1929 when China was run 
by the Kuomintang as the Republic of China. 
They symbolizes Sun Yat-sen’s, a significant 
revolutionary and political leader of the time, 
political philosophy known as the “Three 
Principles of the People”: nationalism, democracy 
and the people’s welfare. [10.18.2005]
On the Zhongshan Gate. [10.18.2005]
I was standing on the Zhongshan Gate, looking 
inside the city wall. The tall tower in the 
foreground is a hotel. [10.18.2005]
I was standing on the Zhongshan Gate, looking 






(Top) A house on the Zhongshan Gate. It was difficult to draw a line between the public 
and private space. When there was no visitors, the entire space became a private paradise. 
When there were visitors, the house became part of the public display. [10.18.2005] 
(Bottom Left) The two men were flying kite on the Zhongshan Gate. Flying kite is a popular 
activity. [10.18.2005]   
(Bottom Middle) I could not continue walking north on the wall. There was a brick wall that 
blocked access to the north. There was a hole through the brick wall. I walked through the 
hole and the path was occupied by the overgrowth of wild vegetation (Bottom Right). I ended 




On January 23, 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang (who reigned from 1368 to 
1398) offered sacrifices to Heaven and Earth at separate suburban 
altars, then offered the patents and seals to four generations of his 
ancestors at the ancestral shrine in the Imperial City, and proceeded to 
the Fengtian Hall at the newly built Forbidden City of Nanjing. There 
he received a congratulatory memorial from generals and government 
officials, concluding his ascension to the throne with an orchestrated 
ceremony. Zhu officially proclaimed the start of the Ming (translated 
as Brightness) dynasty, and made 1368 the first year of Hungwu 
(translated as the Great Martial Power) and himself the Hungwu 
Emperor. It was also the year that massive expansion of the Nanjing 
city wall began. The construction extended the existing city walls of 
Nanjing, formerly known as Yingtianfu that Zhu had recently restored 
during the 1360s to include the Forbidden City and the Imperial City 
to the east and a large area between the Xuanwu Lake and the Qinhuai 
River. Construction of the entire 34 kilometres wall took roughly 20 
years to complete. Approximately 200,000 workers were summoned 
for construction. The new wall rose 14-20 metres above ground, and 
mainly followed the natural terrain of the city. The wall was about 15 
metres thick at the base, tapering to 4-10 metres at its top. Within the 
structure, earth and stone slats were used to fill up the core, followed 
by an exterior layer of grey bricks. 
 During the wall construction, many towns and counties across 
the nation were responsible for manufacturing construction materials, 
primarily the grey bricks (each roughly 42 x 20 x 10 cm).  Emperor Zhu 
ordered 152 counties to manufacture and transport tens of millions of 
bricks to the capital. He required all the manufacturing units to stamp 
the names of the maker and supervisor, and the manufacturing date and 
location on every brick. This law ensured the emperor had the means to 
trace the origin of bricks if any of them failed to meet required standards, 
and impose harsh punishments against the brick maker or the entire 
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2.1  The print shows how a wall is built with 
a pounding earth method - a frame is 
raised and refilled with earth.
manufacturing unit. Scholar Timothy Brook, in The Confusion of Pleasure: 
Commerce and Culture in Ming China, traces the origin of Lu Li, a kiln 
master whose name appears on a brick at Zhonghua Gate (formerly known 
as Jubao Gate – Gate of Assembled Treasures).1 Since the names of the 
county and village are stamped on the brick surface that faces inward, it is 
impossible to tell the exact location of Lu’s kiln without removing the brick 
from the wall. Other than Lu’s name, there are two other names on the 
brick’s outer surface: the Tithing Head Fang Chaozhang and tithing unit 
Guangfu Monastery, both belonging to the lijia system of Ming China. 
The lijia or “hundreds-and-tithing” system grouped ten households into a 
jia (tithing) and ten jias into a li (hundred).2 In the system, the duties of 
the jia head rotated among each of the ten households annually, while the 
post of the li heads was given to the wealthiest households in a community. 
Monasteries and temples were registered as fiscal households in this system; 
Brook theorizes that Guangfu Monastery served as the meal provider for 
Lu Li’s workers. He tracked Guangfu Monastery in historical accounts 
and found eight monasteries in the three closest provinces that carried 
the common name of Guangfu, which means “broad good fortune.” The 
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2.2  The map shows the expansion of the 
city wall under Emperor Zhu of Ming 
Dynasty. The new serpentine wall 
wraps around the Imperial Palaces.
kilometres from Nanjing, and Brook soon realized that bricks were too 
common a local product for the county to record. Nevertheless, Brook’s 
research on Lu’s bricks reveals the importance of the lijia system in shaping 
Ming’s unique social structure under the absolute power of the emperor. 
Every brick on the Nanjing city wall is a reflection of the restrictions, 
both physical and social, placed on the Ming citizens. Zhu determined 
policy based on a personal desire to extend his control to all corners of his 
society.
 First and foremost, Zhu Yuanzhang’s lijia system was used to 
register people for taxation and state services – a convenient way to exert 
control and maintain social order. The system divided the entire population 
into self-sustainable village communities, within which peoples’ movements 
were further restricted: cultivators were bound to specific farming villages, 
soldiers to the frontier, artisans to state service units, and merchants to an 
assigned district established for commerce activity. Zhu Yuanzhang’s aim 
to immobilize the citizenry is evidenced in the Ming Code: those needing 
to travel any farther than 100 li (about 50 kilometres) required a route 
certificate and anyone who changed occupations without the government’s 
permission was severely punished.3 This occupation restriction extended 
from father to son. If Lu Li was a kiln master, most likely his son was as 
well. 
 In addition to constructing his walled Nanjing and imposing the 
system of lijia, Zhu Yuanzhang set out to realize his goal of building a walled 
nation. After driving the Mongols off Chinese soil, he sent thousands of 
soldiers and civilians to the northern frontier to restore and extend the 
Great Wall of China. The Han Chinese realm was once again enclosed by 
a structure that separated the “civilized” from the “barbarians.” 
 Zhu Yuanzhang was perhaps justified in wanting to restructure 
the Chinese universe after China’s century-long Mongol-ruled Yuan 
dynasty. The Mongols had little interest in wall building. Their philosophy 
of openness and continuous expansion contrasted with that of the Han 
Chinese, who advocated internal harmony and social stability. Walls – the 
Great Wall, Nanjing city wall and others – were a symbolic return to a 
harmonic and legitimate China. For Zhu Yuanzhang however, control 
of his own people appeared to be the primary reason for wall building. 
The entire nation was subdivided into both large and small walled 
communities. 
 During the Ming era, the Li Confucianism practiced during the 
Southern Song dynasty was revived in the hopes of strengthening social 
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2.3   Lu Li’s brick is currently embedded in a 
Nanjing city gate. The inscription on the 
brick reads:
 Ten-Tithing Xi Junweng
 Tithing Head Fang Chaozhang
 Kiln master Lu Li
 Brick makers
 Guangfu Monastery
order. But Zhu manipulated the Li Confucianism to restrict people from 
performing any action not in line with Confucian filial hierarchy, which 
was established to protect the power of authority. For Zhu Yuanzhang, 
peoples’ personal freedom was a threat to his rule. Under Zhu, all citizens 
became servants of the emperor. Within the government, Zhu eliminated 
the post of prime minister and centralized all power in his hands.
 Zhu Yuanzhang was also famous for his political persecutions. 
Specialists estimate that between 1376 and 1396, no less than 100,000 
people died from political purges.4 The censorial branch of the government 
had the emperor’s blessing to closely monitor the bureaucratic bodies as 
well as the elite class. This reign of terror bound Ming China in fear and 
prevented anyone, no matter their class or status, from diverging from the 
status quo. Ming Chinese, wealthy and poor, bureaucrats and peasants, 
learned to live under these conditions. Zhu Yuanzhang’s rule was the peak 
of despotic culture in the walled nation. Until the fall of Imperial China in 
1911, the Nanjing city wall, one of Zhu’s greatest masterpieces, signified 
the triumph of despotism and defeat of the people.
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2.4  (Left)  At a brick kiln, the kilnmaster 
checks the temperature as an 
assistant douses the kiln to induce 
superficial glazing.
2.5  (Right)  The brick maker in the 
foreground fills the wooden mold 
with clay, then dresses the brick's 
surface with a finishing wire strung 
on a bow.
2.6  (opposite top) The Jubao Gate was 
a fortified gate which was renowned 
for its boat-like shape. The entire gate 
structure was demolished for urban 
development in the 30’s. 
2.7  (opposite bottom) Bird eye view of 
Nanjing in the 1930s. The South Gate, 
at the lower left corner of the photo, 
is a fortified city gate which has three 
barbicans and four archways. 
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DE-CONSTRUCTION | The Defeat of Rationali ty 
When it was finally completed, the 34 kilometres long Nanjing city wall 
seemed impenetrable.  It is true that no regime could undo Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
efforts in defining Nanjing’s boundaries and identity, but the myth of the 
wall’s supreme defensive powers has been challenged three times. The first 
time was in 1853 when the Taiping rebels conquered Nanjing from the 
Qing empire; the second in 1864, when the Qing troops crushed the 
Taiping and recaptured the city. In both incidents, the mighty city wall 
provided good defence, but only insofar as it delayed the fall of the city 
after days of continuous cannon fire. Both times the wall crumbled when 
the enemies dug deep tunnels into the foundation and used explosives to 
destroy the structure from below. The city wall showed its insufficiencies in 
the face of warplanes, tanks and modern weapons. In 1937, the Japanese 
army broke through the wall at several locations and kept these five to 
six spots as “displays of military glories” and “convenient passageways” 
during the years when Nanjing was under Japanese occupancy.5 During 
the Japanese invasion, a number of the city gates, including the Zhonghua 
Gate, were damaged beyond repair. 
 Regardless of the damage done by military invasions, history 
reveals that the biggest threat to the Nanjing city wall wasn’t the intruders 
but the Nanjing people themselves. The first attempt at demolishing 
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2.8  The east and west side of the Zhong-
hua Gate was demolished to make 
way for traffic in the 30’s. 
parts of the Nanjing city wall began in the 1920s and 1930s, during the 
Nationalist era. The demolition was mainly in response to the need for road 
extensions and building materials by the Nationalist government, which 
was establishing Nanjing as the nationalist capital. Nonetheless, the most 
devastating blows did not occur until Mao Zedong assumed control and 
led China toward his utopian goals of socialism and industrialization. 
 In 1958, massive social movements took place in cities and 
the countryside under Mao’s Great Leap Forward campaign. By this 
time, China was an industry-heavy powerhouse. The Chinese, especially 
farmers and factory workers, saw Mao as their nation’s saviour. Their 
obsession for Mao resembled religious devotion. After a hundred years 
of suffering humiliation by foreign powers and internal class struggles, 
the peasants believed Mao would be the one to strike the right balance 
between the rich and poor, a lead political direction and a fruitful future 
for the nation. In the first five years of Mao’s Chinese Communist Party, 
the communists managed to restore social order and put China back on 
track economically and socially. The success of the Land Reform Policies, 
which emptied the pockets of landowners and redistributed farmlands to 
peasants, and the First Five-Year Plan, which followed the Soviet model 
of state-controlled economic development, helped to solidify blind trust 
and a passive following for Mao and his Party. This was a welcome change 
from the combination of warlord rule, Japanese invasion and civil war in 
the previous years that left little to the nation besides piles of rubble, miles 
of wastelands, and a collapsed economy. 
 1958 marked a year of major shifts in Mao’s thinking, from the 
pragmatism of social restructuring to an infatuation with the power of 
mobilized masses. Mao wanted immediate results in fulfilling his socialist 
dreams, and launched an aggressive policy plan that bordered on sheer 
lunacy and unrealistic projections of growth. He thought that three years 
of collective hard work on industrial production would be sufficient to 
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2.11  (Below) Large scale backyard smelters 
during the Great Leap Forward.
2.10  During the Great Leap Forward, Mao 
ordered the entire nation to involve in 
heavy industry. Commune members 
built backyard steel smelters at the 
Weixing Commune.
2.9   During land reform in the 50’s, Com-
munist Party cadres and villagers held 
struggle meetings to condemn land-
lords. Landlords were often beaten or 
even killed under the accusations of 
unfair treatment of their tenants and 
peasants. 
transform China from a farming nation into an industrialized country, 
and aimed to surpass Britain in industrial production within fifteen years. 
Under his orders, some 90 million people engaged in local, small-scale 
steel smelting operations; almost 99% of the rural populace became the 
members of a People’s Commune, which was regarded as “the basic units 
of Communist society.” On average a commune was made up of about 
5,500 households, which was then divided into production teams.6 The 
aim of a commune is to improve production efficiency by forming a large 
production unit to replace small-scale family-run production. On the 
commune, everything was shared and private ownership of livestock and 
garden plots were forbidden. Traditional family practices were replaced by 
the idealized collective practices. Communal nurseries and kindergartens 
were established to look after the elderly and the children; everyone dined 
together in the commune mess hall. Men and women devoted their time 
and energy entirely to public projects such as water control, irrigation, and 
steel production. But within a few years, the Great Leap Forward proved 
to be a disastrous failure. Despite the capability of the authorities to utilize 
people-power for public projects, the neglect of food production during 
the Great Leap Forward also lead to a catastrophic famine that spread 
across China from 1959 to 1962. Also, because of improper manufacturing 
techniques and professional supervision most of the locally produced steel 
and iron was so inferior that it was unusable. 
 The 1950s was also a defining period for the Nanjing city wall, 
marking its farewell. Up until the 1950s, the Nanjing citizens were free to 
build homes and private gardens on the wall; many also lived in very close 
proximity to a deteriorating wall following years of neglect. The authority 
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2.12  Farmers discussed Mao’s Little Red 
Book during a study break of a com-
mune gathering at Dazhai in1969. 
During the Cultural Revolution, Mao 
touted Dazhai as the model produc-
tion brigade. Only after Mao’s death 
did authorities find that this brigade 
had exaggerated production statistics.
began to aware of the danger of the decaying city wall when a part 
of the wall collapsed, killing three people and wounding another 17 
in the winter of 1954.7 Since then, small-scale demolitions of the wall 
were common occurrences especially when the officials conceived the 
idea of “contemporary usage of the past” and advocated wall demolition 
by offering an incentive to encourage the people to exchange each 
ancient brick for 10 cents RMB.8 By 1958, large organizations from the 
government and citizen groups were all deconstructing the monument. 
The fever of transforming the nation, catching up with the rest of the 
world and escaping poverty and the past united every Nanjing citizen in 
the wall demolition. Their tools ranged from explosives to bare hands. 
Many of the ancient bricks were used in new construction projects, 
and in particular, for the many furnaces that were built across the 
city to support steel production. This was the period when almost all 
resources were allocated for industrial production. This phenomenon 
was common in all of China’s walled cities. The few scholars, poets, 
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2.14  (Opposite & Below) De-construction 
of the Nanjing city wall at the 50s near 
the Taipingmen area.
2.13  The Red Guards hang big character 
posters at Harbin’s University of 
Industry. The billboard reads, “Follow 
Chairman Mao’s great strategy and 
grasp the direction of revolutionary 
struggle.”
painters, and architects who were opposed to razing the wall were ignored, 
alienated, and even persecuted as enemies of the socialist revolution. 
  The destruction of the Nanjing city wall subsided after the 
zealousness of the Great Leap Forward. It was not until 1966, at the 
beginning of another catastrophe – namely the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution – that the wall was finally destroyed. In order to regain 
absolute control of the Party after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, 
Mao gambled a third time, triggering a revolution that would quash all 
of his political opponents and other counter-revolutionists and transform 
the nation. He ordered Jiang Qing (his wife), Kang Shang, Yao Wenyuan 
and Zhang Chunqiao to form the Cultural Revolution Group (CRG). 
This sole group soon became the Party’s voice. The CRG possessed two 
crucial weapons: people’s blind trust in Mao and the radical tendencies of 
students and workers. The slogan, “let us unite and hold high the glorious 
red banner of Mao Zedong thought… resolutely, thoroughly, totally and 
completely wipe out all monsters and demons and all counter-revolutionary 
revisionists of the Khrushchev type and carry the socialist revolution 
through to the end,” fuelled the movement at Peking University.9 In the 
autumn of 1966, over 13 million youth marched to Beijing to participate 
in eight gigantic parades at Tiananmen Square in front of Mao, who stood 
high on the Tiananmen Gate like the emperors of Ming and Qing. The 
crowd wore red armbands, sang songs in praise of Mao’s glory and listened 
to speeches by the CRG, who had formed a radical group known as the 
Red Guards whose first mission was to attack teachers, then parents, 
intellectuals, bourgeoisie, revisionists, and ultimately all designated 
“counter-revolutionary” enemies of China. By the end of 1966, the working 
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2.15  (Left) De-construction of the 
Nanjing city wall in the 40s at the 
Guanghuamen area, (Middle) at the 
Shuiximen area, and (Right) at the 
Tongjimen area.
class was also encouraged to participate. By then, students and workers 
had become an uncontrollable mob. The revolution swamped society with 
violence, turbulence, betrayal, censorship, persecution, and prejudice. 
Many people, especially intellectuals, were continuously interrogated and 
tortured over the ten-year period. They were often beaten, humiliated, 
forced to confess to ridiculous charges, and paraded on streets dressed as 
demons. Many could not withstand the torture and committed suicide. 
The following is a recounting of terrible acts that happened every day in 
almost every family during the destructive Cultural Revolution:
…Yingxia’s father committed suicide, too. He was a country 
doctor in a commune clinic, famous for his knowledge of 
traditional medicine, but he was denounced a “reactionary 
academic authority.” One night, some rebels placed him in 
front of a coal-burning stove until he was drenched with sweat, 
then forced him to strip down to his underclothes and sent him 
outdoors to stand in the snow until he was nearly frozen. The 
following day he hanged himself.
 When Yingxia found out, she burst into tears. But she 
didn’t have time to grieve. She washed her face and, with her eyes 
still swollen, reported to the propaganda-team representative at 
the paper. For the sake of her own future, she couldn’t show any 
emotion. “My father has betrayed the Cultural Revolution,” she 
said. “And I want to ‘draw a line’ between him and myself.” Even 
so, afterward Yingxia – like Peikui – was considered “politically 
unreliable” and forced to attend study sessions. She had been 
thought one of the best editors at the paper, but after her father’s 
suicide she was no longer allowed to work in the editorial 
department at all.10
 One of the fundamental concepts of the Cultural Revolution was 
the attack on “The Four Olds” – ideas, culture, customs and habits. The 
Red Guards were told to battle against the reputed bearers of these “evils,” 
whether they were people or objects. Books, religious items, European 
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2.16  (Left) The monks are forced to 
self-criticize their religious belief by 
holding a banner that reads, “To hell 
with the Buddhist scriptures. They are 
full of dog farts.”
2.17  (Middle) Stocks, securities certifi-
cates, and savings-deposit books 
confiscated in home searches are 
burned at a rally led by Red Guards.
2.18  (Right) Newly wed couple decorate 
their bedroom with Mao’s portrait but 
are later criticized for making love 
under the eyes of Mao.
music, art, stamp collections, antiques, and even goldfish were considered 
manifestations of a bourgeois-style of living or of the “four olds.” Like 
other ancient Chinese monuments, the Nanjing city wall also fell in victim 
to the revolution. The wall was used to plant gardens, ponds, electrical 
poles, and even farm fields; 164 bomb shelters were carved into the 
structure. Over 10 kilometres of tunnels were dug through the centre of 
the wall, covering over 30,000 square metres.11 Bricks from the wall were 
taken for private construction projects and also for miscellaneous use, like 
exercise weights. Large sections of the wall crumbled during the Cultural 
Revolution, damaged by water, plantations and digging. The structure 
stood as a worthless, wasted wall of earth. Things like heritage, history, 
architectural design and the poetics of space all belonged to the “counter-
revolutionist” culture, and so were vilified.
 The Cultural Revolution was responsible for the greatest cultural 
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2.19  The accused is publicly denounced at 
the Red Guard Square in Harbin. His 
face is smeared with black ink and 
he is forced to wear a ill-fitting paper 
dunce cap. He was criticized as being 
the “black gang elements.”
and historical losses in Chinese history. Yet, compared to the damage 
inflicted on humankind, these losses are minimal. As renowned writer 
Feng Jicai suggests “if the calamity of the fascist regime was its damage 
to human bodies, the calamity of the Cultural Revolution was its damage 
to human souls.”12 Commenting on the damage inflicted by the Cultural 
Revolution, Feng further elaborates: 
…more serious was the uncalculated loss to China’s traditional 
cultural heritage. Still the greatest damage was to the Chinese 
people’s simple and honest nature. The Cultural Revolution 
made us more calculating, shrewd, brutal, practical, hypocritical 
and vain… The damage may be permanent.13
Official figures from the late 1970s show that 729,000 people were 
persecuted during the revolution and 34,900 were beaten to death.14 
Many historians and social critics alike believe that the true figures are 
far in excess of the official numbers and peg the count at 100 million 
affected and half a million deaths.15 In addition to the tens of thousands 
of persecuted, tens of millions more people, mainly the educated, were 
relocated to the countryside and the school system was closed for five 
years. An entire generation was nearly illiterate. The climate of terror and 
pressure from collectivization further segregated people. Family bonds 
were weakened and mutual trust among neighbours ceased to exist – a 
wall had been built between people. Life in China would never be simple 
again. 
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2.20  (Top Left) Jile Temple is destroyed by 
the Red Guards under the banner of 
“smash the old world.” The Buddhist 
statues are desecrated with paper 
dunce caps.
2.21  (Top Right) Denunciation of a staff 
member in a news agency, accused of 
following the capitalist line and oppos-
ing the mass movement.
A dramatic shift from utopian ideology to a pragmatic market economy 
took place in China after Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978. Under 
his famous motto, “to get rich is glorious,” Deng ignited China’s economic 
boom by opening the nation to foreign investors and allowing the Chinese 
people to enjoy certain degrees of economic freedom. Without losing 
the merit of communism, Deng defined his capital economic reform 
as “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which was a mixed market 
economy under political authoritarianism. Once China steered away from 
her insular policy and embraced the world with her powerful labour force 
and huge market, boundaries around this socialist and ancient nation 
began to dissolve in favour of the overwhelming international trading and 
business activities. As the nation capitalized on business opportunities from 
all over the world, the socialist structure of the Chinese society pushed 
to the wayside in the race to modernize. Meanwhile, the emergence of 
Western lifestyles and thinking questioned the legitimacy of the existing 
authoritarian government. Deng had been aware that, if you unlatch the 
window, it’s hard to stop the flies and mosquitoes rushing in.16 The Chinese 
RE-CONSTRUCTION | Revival of National Glory
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2.22  Reconstruction of the Yifengmen in 
2005. 
authorities needed to somehow fill the ideological void left by the decline 
of Maoism in order to stabilize their power and to counterbalance any 
challenge from foreign political beliefs. In response to the ideological void, 
Deng decided to revive nationalism and cultural egocentrism. Deng’s 
response resembles a common phenomenon in western contemporary 
culture in the age of insecurity when the pace of life speeded up rapidly 
after the end of the Cold War. Andreas Huyssen, a cultural critic, in the 
essay “Sculpture, Materiality and Memory in an Age of Amnesia” states his 
observation of how we negotiate the rapid change in culture:
In the face of speed-up and collapse of stable boundaries, 
there seem to be two prominent solutions: either embrace and 
celebrate such deterritorializations as liberating and go surfing 
on the endless flow of spectacles, distractions and commodities, 
or seek solace and anchoring in identity politics (cultural, ethnic, 
sexual, racial) or religious fundamentalism.17
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2.23  The official plan for the revitalization 
project of the Nanjing city wall. Five 
sections of the city wall became des-
ignated “scenic hot spots.”
In the case of China, having an ideological void is like a collapse of stable 
boundaries. Deng’s solution was to consolidate the nation through a “pro-
traditional cultural policy.” 18 For instance, Deng promoted the Great Wall 
of China as a long surviving symbol of unity. This cultural icon filled the 
ideological void left by abandoning Maoist belief.19 Although the memory 
of the Great Wall was full of sorrow as thousands of people had sacrificed 
their lives for the construction, re-inventing the Great Wall as a cultural 
heritage helped to make the past memory easy to embrace. As David 
Lowenthal argues in his essay “Fabricating Heritage,”  
…it is futile to vilify heritage as biases. Prejudiced pride in the past 
is not the sorry upshot of heritage but its essential aim. Heritage 
attests our identity and affirms our worth. When the patriot 
upholds “my country, right or wrong,” heritage tells him it is always 
right. 20
 In 1984, Deng launched the national campaign “Love China, 
Restore Our Great Wall”. Over the next five years or so tens of millions of 
RMB were poured into the wall’s restoration, especially at the Badaling area 
where approximately 760 metres of wall were smartened up to showcase 
the standard.21 Since then, other major historical monuments such as the 
Nanjing city wall have regained their significance, at least under official 
slogans and law.
 Under Deng’s campaign, in 1988, the status of the Nanjing 
city wall was elevated from abandoned ruin to a national cultural relic. 
Restoring and reconstructing the city wall emerged as a mission of pride 
for the people in Nanjing. The government immediately made an urgent 
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2.24   Since 2000, the revitalization project 
of the Nanjing city wall has forced 
about a thousand of low income fami-
lies to relocate. 
 The picture above is a community 
made up of about 10 households, 
which have been living on the Nanjing 
city wall since late 1970s. Some of 
them grow vegetables on the Wall 
for sale to make a living. In 2001, the 
government issued a formal notice 
forbidding the residents from farming 
on the city wall. 
announcement calling for the return of stolen bricks for proper restoration 
work. By 2001, 6 million of the original bricks had been gathered through 
this programme.22 It is not difficult to find news headlines that relate to 
the Nanjing city wall in domestic newspaper such as “World’s Longest 
Ancient City Wall to Apply for World Heritage Listing,” “Ancient City 
Wall Gets Facelift,” or “Nanjing to spend 1.66 billion to link 12 sections 
of the Ming wall in 3 years,” expressing a sense of collective pride. The 
entire city seemed equally passionate about the “rebirth” of the “600-
year-old man,” a common name used by the locals when describing the 
city wall. The municipal government successfully put the city wall on the 
wish list of all Nanjing citizens: that one day the monument would be 
accepted as an UNESCO world heritage site; that one day the wall and 
thus the city, would gain worldwide recognition; that one day Nanjing 
would benefit greatly from tourism; that one day the city would be 
swamped within glory of the past and modern success. This follows a 
common phenomenon as suggested in Timothy Mitchell’s essay “Making 
the Nation,” that reinvigoration of the past became a common political 
strategy many nations have taken:  
One of the odd things about the arrival of the era of the modern 
nation-state was that for a state to prove it was modern, it helped 
if it could also prove it was ancient.  A nation that wanted to 
show it was up to date and deserved a place among the company 
of modern states needed, among other things, to produce a 
past.23
 Apart from economic and cultural reform, many Chinese 
speculated that Deng Xiaoping, a victim of the Cultural Revolution, 
would promise some sort of political reform, steering the nation to a 
democratic future. In the first year after Deng seized power, the public 
enjoyed a brief period of political liberalization in which the public had 
greater freedom to express their criticisms towards the government and 
the Maoist regime. Their critiques were posted up on a low brick wall 
in central Beijing, which attracted thousands of political discontents 
from around the nation to express their political opinions on the wall. 
Renowned Chinese writer Wang Shan recalls the incident in an interview 
published in China Remembers:
The Democracy Wall Movement began in autumn 1978 with the 
pasting up of some ‘big-character posters’ (dazibao) on a blank 
wall in Xidan, about 2 kilometres west of Tiananmen Square. 
The earliest posters described personal suffering and tragedies: 
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their authors were mainly people who had been wronged during 
the Cultural Revolution. Many had come from outside Beijing; 
now they wanted rehabilitation for themselves or their families.
 The Wall became so popular it attracted hundreds 
and thousands of people. Every day after work, people rushed 
to Xidan to see the new posters. There were quite a number of 
people like me, from fairly privileged backgrounds, who were 
drawn to the movement. During the Cultural Revolution, we 
all ended up at the bottom of the society, where we saw plenty 
of injustice, caused to a large degree by the undemocratic social 
system. We were interested in politics and hoped to change that 
system.
 The posters soon progressed from telling personal 
stories to discussing wider political issues. Young intellectuals, 
who comprised most of the participants, began to ask what 
were the causes of these tragedies – some even dared to point 
fingers directly at Mao – and how to prevent them. Democracy 
Wall responded very sensitively to the struggle underway in the 
leadership…
 It was a very primitive form of democracy, inherited 
from the Cultural Revolution era, for the big-character poster was 
Mao’s creation. Yet it also showed people were seeking modern 
democracy – to express one’s views freely and independently in 
public, without approval or censorship by any authority. It was 
unprecedented in the thirty-year history of the PRC. 
 After the Party’s Third Plenum in December 1978, 
Deng Xiaoping’s political position was secured. As he gained 
more and more power, his popularity soared. Gradually, down 
at Democracy Wall, the restless youth began to ask questions 
about him. Firstly, how to prevent Deng from becoming the new 
Mao Zedong; secondly, though Deng is a wise leader with great 
political experience, if he does not give the people democracy, is 
it not inevitable that he will repeat Mao’s mistakes? 24 
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2.25  In April 1978, Deng encouraged writ-
ers to outpour their suffering during 
the Cultural Revolution. In late autumn 
in the same year, a low brick wall in 
Beijing,  2 km west of Tiananmen 
Square, was quickly covered in po-
ems, posters and letters, which often 
voiced political concerns. This wall 
was called the Democracy Wall.
 At the beginning Deng encouraged the people to freely express 
their political opinions. He even declared to an American journalist at the 
time, “The people want to speak. Let them!”.25  This immediately fostered 
Deng as a great reformist, until a young electrician called Wei Jingsheng 
biked to the wall one morning and put up a poster that demanded a 
“fifth modernization” – an urge for greater individual freedom. Wei also 
showed his determination by signing his name on his poster. Since then, 
as historian Julia Lovell describes,
… visitors to Democracy Wall, as it became known, were no 
longer reading in silence but making speeches, speaking frankly 
to foreign journalists, distributing samizdat journals, founding 
societies and discussion groups, and marching to Tiananmen, 
where impromptu mass meetings took place. ‘This Wall,’ someone 
shouted, ‘is the base which supports democracy in China’.25
It did not take long to see the limit of Deng’s tolerance of democracy. 
After six months of political liberalization, Deng could no longer tolerate 
the public demand for political transparency and the radical comments on 
the Democracy Wall. Wei Jingsheng, who became an advocate of Chinese 
democracy, was arrested in March in 1979 and sentenced to fifteen years 
of imprisonment. Magazines and discussions forums were banned. All of 
those who took part in the Movement were asked to confess and swear 
never to be involved in such events again. Meanwhile, the Democracy Wall, 
was demolished, and later replaced by the Bank of China headquarters.
 Deng’s repression on citizens’ freedom of speech resembled a 
similar incident that happened during Mao Zedong’s regime, twenty-one 
years before. After founding the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao 
and his Communist Party made inroads in stabilizing the national economy, 
redistributing farmland, and perhaps most importantly, boosting the 
nation’s morale by pursuing a socialist utopia. In 1956, he sponsored the 
Hundred Flowers Movement that allowed intellectuals, whom he despised 
in the past, to voice their social and political criticisms. Considering 
the success of his regime, Mao was confident that the critiques would 
be gentle, and perhaps non-existent. Mao was probably surprised when 
the Movement lashed out with a number of severe criticisms against the 
Party and Mao’s policies. To Mao, these censures were both inconceivable 
and unbearable. Thus, in 1957 the Party destroyed the Movement with 
its brutal Anti-Rightist Campaign. So-called “rightists,” or “enemies of 
socialism” were promptly arrested – the by-now normal course of action 
in China to quell social critics. 
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 After the Democracy Wall incident, Deng basically put all of his 
efforts into reshaping China in an economic context. He strongly advocated 
pragmatism that consolidated a collective will of modernization. Deng 
attempted to fix the society’s sightline on a fruitful and wealthy future. 
His strategy was successful to a certain extent, most notably in cities 
where citizens could get a taste of the luxurious benefits of China’s rapid 
modernization. However, social discontent continued to grow throughout 
the nation in the 1980s as the gap between the rich and the poor widened. 
Despite the fall of the Democracy Wall, the hope for political reform didn’t 
die down amongst intelligentsia and university students.
 Hu Yaobang, the main executor of Deng’s open-door policy, 
the reform-minded Communist Party leader who re-examined the cases 
of hundreds of thousands of unfairly persecuted individuals during the 
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2.26  Photographer Patrick Zach-
mann took the photos for 
Corriere della Sera, Italy’s 
best-selling newspaper, 
during the June Fourth 
Movement. The images 
ran as a beautiful and 
touching testimony of the 
demonstrator’s hopes for 
the movement.
Cultural Revolution, was forced to resign in 1987 from 
his post as the General Secretary in the show of autocratic 
power by the Party. Three years later, Hu died on April 
15, 1989. His death triggered a massive demonstration 
in cities throughout China; the most large-scale of which 
happened in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. There, the 
public commemoration of the death of Hu turned into an 
ongoing non-violent protest calling for an end to official 
corruption and reforms on many aspects like political 
democracy to bureaucratic restructuring. The protestors, 
mainly university students and intelligentsia, soon gained 
sympathy abroad and wide support for its agenda. In face of 
the growing publicity of the protest which threatened the 
legitimacy of the Party, the authority made an catastrophic 
decision to crush the movement with military force on 
June 4, 1989. 
 The massive outcry over the June Fourth Incident 
and its bloody ending led the Party to redefine some of its 
policies, including a stronger emphasis on media control 
and nationalistic propaganda, along with stable economic 
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2.27  (Top Left) The public commemora-
tion of the death of Hu turned into an 
ongoing non-violent protest calling 
for an end of official corruption.
2.28  (Top Right) In the summer of 1989, 
approximately 10,000 of students 
and workers gathered at the Tianan-
men Square in Beijing protesting for 
an increase in the transparency of 
government. 
growth, which would bring living improvements that no citizen could 
refuse. The June Fourth Movement allows the authorities to witness the 
eruptive force of political dissidents when social discontents unite the mass 
and gain international support and sympathy. Since then, the authorities 
restrict the freedom of speech and exercise vigorous censorship and 
repression of dissidents to avoid large-scale demonstration. Only through 
censorship and repression can they disconnect the public from political 
activities and dissidents, thus minimizing the opposing power in the 
society. While the government is rebuilding the ancient walls as symbols 
of national unity, they are also reconstructing a wall in people’s mind, a 
barrier that hinders individuals to speak up about social discontents and 
individual desires. The public becomes cold and helpless towards politics 
and can only seek for a sense of security in the covetous pursuit of material 
goods.    
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2.31  (Opposite Below) The morning after 
the massacre, bicycles and the dead 
bodies of students are scattered    
everywhere in Tiananmen Square.
2.29  (Above) An anonymous Chinese 
photographer requested  two foreign 
journalists, David and Peter Turnley, to 
smuggle this picture out of China.
2.30  (Opposite Top) Support of the dem-
onstration from various professions: 
(Left) Writers and editors demanded 
freedom of the press, (Middle) judges 
expressed support for the student 
hunger strikes (Right) medical workers 





I imagined myself as a farmer, who carried a clod of land on my back. 
This clod of land contained seeds of cultural memory, from which roots grew 
downwards to the soil, where they belonged. I planted the seeds of cultural 
memory at each pause on my journey and I carried them with me from 
place to place, from east to west and vice versa.
My back carries roots that belong to different lands. They entangle and 
interweave as they grow. I can no longer distinguish which strand of roots 
belongs to which land. At one point, I thought of pulling my roots out to set 
free my soul—free from the confusion of my hybrid cultural identity. I tried 
but I was filled with pain.
The more I struggled to remove my roots, the stronger the force pulled me 
back to my cultural lands. I can never eradicate my roots. They are buried 
in my subconscious. They are part of me. I am who I am because of this 
unique amalgamation of cultural roots. I can only set free from my suffocating 
struggle if I can accept my hybrid cultural mixture. 




Materials: Plaster bandage sculpture, 
hempen rope, mirror buried in soil, and 
projection. 
Sculpture of a body hangs in the 
exhibition space with the roots falling 
vertically to a pile of soil on the ground. 
The mirror buried in the soil creates a 
strong vertical relationship between the 
sky, the body and the land.  An image 
of the entangled roots is projected onto 
the sculpture and casts shadow onto 
the white wall behind to create a dual 
condition: the physical existence and 
the subconscious mind. The hanging 
sculpture represents the physical 
existence with strong attachment to the 
ground and the shadow represents the 
subconscious mind which is chaotic 




 I I I   N a t i o n  a n d  B o u n d a r y
In traditional Chinese buildings, walls were not designed as load bearing 
components. Walls always served as screening device in between structural 
elements of the enclosure. The design of the wall varies from foldable 
partitions to a thick mud wall depending on local climate and social 
status of inhabits. In ancient Chinese language, various characters were 
used referring to a wall, depending on its functionality, from concealment, 




壁, 辟也, 所以辟禦風寒也° -釋名1
Qiang:  connoted what was used to hide oneself.
Yuan:  connoted what one leaned on and thus took as 
protection.
Yong:  connoted what was used to hide and to fortify.
Bi: connoted what warded off and resisted against 
wind and cold.
    -Shi Ming 1 
Ying Zao Fa Shi (The Handbook of Architectural Planning and Construction), 
written by Li Jie in 1103 during the Northern Song Dynasty, is the most 
significant ancient account of Chinese architecture. In it, Li references 
11 different ancient sources for the meaning of “wall.” These 11 sources 
reference 15 different Chinese characters, each a variation on “man-made 
barrier.” There are a number of characters to describe the various types of 
wall such as: 
high walls around courtyards were called qiang, which connoted 
what was used to shield oneself; house walls and part walls were 
called bi, which connoted what warded off and resisted the wind 
and cold; and low walls were called yuan, which connoted what 
one leaned on and thus took as protection. 2 
3.1   Pictograph of the Chinese character, 
cheng, translated as city. It also means 
qiang, translated as wall.
Defining Wall
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Most of these characters are no longer in use today, but interestingly 
enough, qiang, which connoted the medium used to hide oneself in 
classical definition, is now the most commonly used Chinese character 
for all types of wall. This definition of wall embraces an idea of insularity 
towards wall building: from an external point of view, walls prevent 
external disruptions to interfere with internal order; from inside, walls 
shield the domestic disgraceful affairs from the outsider.
 
 
 The concept of a nation becomes unthinkable without walls. The 
Chinese character of a nation (pronounced guo) is composed of a pictogram 
of a four-walled enclosure within which is the three components for the 
formation of a kingdom: land, people and sovereignty with military power. 
The concept of a nation can only exist if there are boundaries that define 
military power and a territory for the people. Wall defines the inside and 
the outside. Beyond the walls lay the wilderness and the barbaric forces 
of foreign lands,  Within the walls lay sacred order of the Mandate of 
Heaven. 
 In the following section, we will take a closer look at how the 
wall plays a fundamental role in the making of the Chinese nation, from 
the mythical creation of the national boundary to the philosophy behind 
the making of the Great Wall. This fundamental concept of wall as a 
representation of egocentrism has deeply influenced the development of 
the Chinese social psyche as the civilization evolves within the national 
boundary. 
=                  +          
Kingdom       Boundary Synonym of kingdom, which embraced 
meaning of sovereignty, land and people 
ideogram of an ancient 
weapon (power)             
3.2   The etymology of the 
Chinese character, guo, 
translated as kingdom 
or country.
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China’s Ethnocentr ic Worldview 
During the Neolithic period, many tribes occupied the regions 
surrounding the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, where civilization began. 
While the stronger groups—ancestors of the Han Chinese—merged and 
became a more agriculturally-advanced settlement, many of the remaining 
hunter-gatherer tribes were forced out of the fertile river regions, and later 
even beyond the boundaries of the Chinese world. The non-Han people 
expelled to the east were named “Yi,” to the south “Man,” to the west 
“Rong,” and to the north “Di.”3  These people were exiled by the Han 
Chinese to the less fertile lands in inhospitable zones where agriculture 
was not possible. Hence, they turned to nomadism and became the horse-
riding warriors that would threaten and penetrate into the Chinese frontier 
for millennia to come. The Han Chinese called these horse-riding nomad 
invaders “barbarians.”
 The Han Chinese had a strong concept of division between 
civilization and barbarism since the prehistoric time. In Shan Hai Jing (the 
Classic of Mountain and Seas)—a collection of Chinese mythology that is 
at least 2,000 years old—the ancient China was depicted as a square earth 
that was surrounded by four seas, North, South, East and West, which 
separated the wilderness from the “sacred heartland” and defined the inner 
and the outer.4 
 Another historical account Shu Jing also presented the Chinese 
concentric worldview in this classical scripture of Chinese antiquity. It 
contains the story of Yu, a public official who rose to the throne after the 
death of King Shun and founded China’s first dynasty, Xia (2100-1600 
BC). According to the legend, Yu traveled the known world to drain the 
mighty flood waters that “surged towards the heavens, so vast that they 
embraced the mountains and covered the hills.” He was sent to “open the 
nine lands, connect the nine roads, embank the nine lakes and survey the 
nine mountains.” Yu organized the known world and established order by 
holding a water level and chalk line in his left hand, and a compass and 
carpenter’s square in his right. In a nod to this legend, the Chinese character 
for “order” is “gui ju”—gui means compass and ju means carpenter’s square. 
The legend also presents the earliest order of the Chinese world:
Yu made the land five-hundred li (one li is about one-third of 
a mile) outside of the Son of Heaven’s city the supply domain. 
The farm tax for the first hundred li was paid in sheaves of 
grain, for the next hundred li in ears of grain, for the next 
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hundred li in spikes of grain, for the next hundred li in unhulled 
grain, and for the last hundred li in hulled grain.
He made the land fi ve-hundred li outside of the supply domain 
the warning domain. Th e fi rst hundred li were the ranking 
offi  cers’ fi efs. Th e next hundred li were the barons’ fi efs, and the 
last three-hundred li were the feudal lords’ fi efs.
He made the land fi ve-hundred li outside of the warning 
domain the peace-securing domain. For the fi rst three-hundred 
li they modifi ed the teachings of the central government 
according to the situation. For the last two-hundred li, they 
maintained military garrisons at full strength. 
He made the land fi ve-hundred li outside of the peace-securing 
domain the reinforcing domain. Th e fi rst three-hundred li held 
the Yi people (barbarians), the next two-hundred li held exiled 
men.
He made the fi ve-hundred li outside of the reinforcing domain 
the wild domain. Th e fi rst three-hundred li held the Man 
people (barbarians). Th e next two-hundred li held banished 
men.
To the east these domains extended to the ocean, to the west 
they covered the Liu-sha (desert), and to the limits of both 
north and south. Th e government’s advice and instructions 
encompassed the world.
After this, the King Shun bestowed on Yu a black-jade tablet, 
announcing to the world his successful accomplishments. Th e 
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3.7 The Five Domains of Shang 
cartography, a depiction of Yu's order 
of the Chinese world.
 Yu’s order of the Chinese world can be interpreted as five 
concentric zones with the Chinese royal capital city at its centre. The 
further away from the centre of Chinese civilization, the more barbaric 
the people were.6 It presents the idea that China was the centre of the 
world. This ethnocentric worldview expanded as the ancient Chinese 
began treating the sacred “square earth” as China, calling it “The Middle 
Kingdom.” 
 To distance themselves from the four barbarian outposts and 
secure a position in the centre of the world, the Chinese, since mythical 
times, have defined their national boundaries by the limits of geographic 
barriers, namely the mountains in the west, forests in the southwest, desert 
in the northwest and seas in the east and south. Where the north of the 
nation opens to the vast Mongolian grasslands, the Chinese completed 
their protective enclosure by building the famous Wan Li Chang Cheng—
the Great Wall of a Thousand Miles. Wall, the basic element of space 
planning, completed the outermost boundaries of the Chinese universe, 
within which the Hans intended to evolve and flourish forever.
 In reality, China’s national boundaries have been fluid since 
prehistoric times and during the feudal ages (Xia, Shang and Zhou) and 
dynasties of the centralized state (Qin, Han, Sui, Tang, Song, Ming, Qing, 
and Nationalist and Communist regimes). This history was interrupted 
by periods of cultural fusion with the barbarians, and foreign occupancies 
by the Tartars, Japanese and Western colonial powers. It was often after 
foreign occupancy that Chinese culture absorbed new ideas and restored a 
sense of unity, pride and order.
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3.8   President Richard Nixon's visit in 
1972 signaled China's willingness 
to open for foreign trade. This 
led to the arrival of increasingly 
large numbers of businessmen 
and tourists. With a rising number 
of tourists, the Wall were slowly 
restored section by section 
and  became a popular tourist 
attraction.
The Great Wall:  The Scar of Autocracy in China
The Great Wall, replicated in smaller city walls all over China—
and within those city walls in even small walls, encircling private 
family compounds—stands for protection as well as oppression. 
One implies the other: You are controlled for your own protection; 
a giant prison is built for the safety of its inmates.
 
- Ian Buruma, Bad Elements
Along with pandas and Mao, the Great Wall is one of China’s most well-
known icons. Not only has the Wall become its number one tourist 
attraction, but it has also served as an ambassador, promoting the grandeur 
of ancient China to the world. Nixon himself said, “This is a great wall!” 
when he stepped onto it in 1972. The Great Wall of China was not built 
as a single structure. It is a network of wall segments that stretch east to 
west across the northern part of the country. These wall segments were 
built in various dynasties as physical expressions of an emperor’s desire 
to protect his empire from the “barbarians” (nomadic non-Chinese 
tribes) and to centralize his heavenly-mandated power within the walled 
nation.7  Nonetheless, history has shown that these defence systems were 
not sufficient in keeping out the horse-riding nomads from advancing 
south.. Since the earliest wall-building effort in the Qin dynasty (221-206 
BC), the Wall, to most citizens, signified the ultimate misfortune of harsh 
labour and cruel banishment from home. Qin folklore often associated 
the Wall with death as construction workers usually died on site and were 
buried below the wall; most workers would never see their families again. 
Working conditions were harsh; workers often died from exhaustion, 
starvation and exposure to the bitterly cold winter blizzards. Many others 
were executed by regional officials simply because of their delayed arrival 
to the construction site, which according to Qin law, was deserving of the 
death penalty. Thus the Wall symbolized the Qin government’s tyrannical 
rule—people lived in fear of severe punishments. After Qin, the Han and 
the Ming emperors continued to expand, restore and strengthen the Wall 
as the northern frontier of the Chinese empire, and at the same time, 
exercised extreme centralization of political power within the walled 
nation. In the past two decades, the Great Wall has once again gone 
through massive restorations. The Communist Party proclaimed the Wall 
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a feat of national pride and unity, without bothering to tell much about its 
hostile past. Yet to many who know the history of the Wall, it marked the 
mass graves of hundreds of thousands of builders lying below the Wall’s 
shadow. The Great Wall was a witness to China’s perpetual cycles of pride 
and sorrow. 
The history of the Great Wall began when northern China was under 
constant attack from powerful nomadic tribes in the north and west (today’s 
Inner Mongolia, Xianjiang region, Mongolia and southern Siberia), whom 
the Chinese referred as barbarians. In 771 BC, Quan Rong, a powerful 
nomadic tribe from the northwest seized the Chinese capital of Western 
Zhou (1025-771 BC) and killed the emperor. The emperor’s successor 
was forced to abandon the ruined capital and established his throne at 
the east capital of Loyang, marking the beginning of the Eastern Zhou 
period (771-256 BC). The Eastern Zhou period was divided into two 
sub-periods: Spring-Autumn (722-481 BC) and Warring States (403-221 
BC). The 1400-year-old feudal system was about to collapse as kingship 
in Eastern Zhou became no more than a nominal title, and the king lost 
control of all but a small parcel of land around the capital. A handful of 
powerful warlords divided up the nation and constantly competed with one 
another for territories and political influence. Hence the Spring-Autumn 
period, also known as the Hundred-Blossoms period, provided great 
opportunities for various political, philosophical and military theorists, 
such as Lao Tzu, Confucius, and Sun Tzu to develop and promote their 
theories to the warlords. It was during this period that the long-standing 
Chinese autocracy, a combination of legalism and Confucianism, began 
to take shape.
 The Warring States period began when one-by-one the Spring-
Autumn warlords declared themselves kings and searched for ways 
to conquer other kingdoms. Massive wall construction first took place 
during this time; warlords built earthen and stone walls at certain parts 
of their borders to defend against each other as well as the horse-riding 
invaders. In 221 BC, Qin conquered all remaining kingdoms and unified 
China. Ying Zheng, the king of Qin at that time, adopted a new title 
for himself as—”the First Emperor of Qin”—and formed a centralized 
government that ruled the nation with thirty-six commanderies. From 
that moment, autocracy gradually maturated as the Chinese bureaucracy 
developed around the absolute power of the emperor. As time went on, 
the autocratic system became so deeply rooted in Chinese society that no 
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3.9   (Opposite and Above) The now barely 
discernible Great Wall. Photo: Daniel 
Schwartz.
matter how many times dynasties fell and emperors were replaced, the 
autocratic system always remained strong and unchanged.
 The First Emperor of Qin used legalism as a tool to generate 
public fear in order to consolidate his power. He and his chief minister 
abolished all political theories except their own to enforce a punishing 
utilitarian philosophy. Historian Julian Lovell gave an example of such 
ruthless law: “[A]nyone who failed to report a crime committed by another 
member of his or her group ‘would be chopped in two at the waist.’”8 
Moreover, to repress subversive thoughts and rebellious aristocrats from 
the former six kingdoms of the Warring States period, Ying Zheng burned 
all literary, historical and philosophical texts from previous periods. He 
also buried Confucian scholars alive. Order and stability were maintained 
by the full ideological control and the fear of harsh punishments. Ying 
Zheng’s rulings ultimately ended the Spring-Autumn period, a period 
during which various political philosophies were allowed to flourished. 
Besides repressing political thought, he also successfully unified China by 
standardizing the units of measurement, currency and written language.9 
Not surprisingly, he was also the first emperor to possess a continuous 
fortified structure by connecting segments of the defensive walls from 
previous kingdoms. This structure, known today as the Great Wall, sat at 
the northern frontier of Qin China,. 
 While many stories and legends on the Qin Great Wall spoke of 
miracles that aided  construction, there were also tales that accounted for 
the workmen’s and soldiers’ personal sufferings, the actual people that made 
the miracles happen. The most famous tale is the one of Meng Jiangnu, a 
young wife, searching for her husband at the Wall’s construction site of the 
Wall. Unable to find him, she cried until the wall crumbled to reveal the 
 98 
corpse of her husband buried inside the Wall.10 The tale begins with the 
couple’s parting during their wedding night:
 
      At the time of taking leave from his wife
                  he did not speak for long,
      For he hoped as it were between morning
                  and evening to come back to his home.
      Who could think that he would suddenly meet
                  disaster by pestle and hammer,
      His soul be dissolved, his life finished—
                  that he should perish at the frontier wall?
      After he had taken leave and reached the 
                  Long Wall
      The officials in charge of the work there 
                  treated him with bitter harshness.
      When he died his body was at once built into 
                  the Wall,
      His wandering soul strayed far amid the 
                  thorns and the brambles…11
 The tale of Meng Jiangnu was passed down from generation to generation 
to remind people of the suffering and hardships during the construction. 
It also reminded people of the tyranny of Emperor Ying Zheng who 
forced 700,000 workers to build his mausoleum and executed around 460 
scholars during his reign. 
 Despite Emperor Ying Zheng’s attention on border defence and 
centralization of political power, the Qin empire was short-lived and 
fell merely four years after the emperor’s death. The Great Wall couldn’t 
protect the regime from internal rebel forces. After a chaotic power 
struggle within the walled nation, China was again united and ruled by 
another centralized government under the Han emperor in 206 BC. The 
Han adopted many of the Qin’s political systems except its legalist system. 
The Han emperors believed that the failure of the Qin was caused by the 
lack of public support, a consequence of the harsh civic laws. Thus they 
adopted a political concept endorsed by scholars, which was Confucianism, 
to establish social order and maximize their power. As the Han emperors 
built their empire, they also renovated and strengthened the Qin Great 
Wall. They extended the Great Wall thousands of kilometres westward as 
military successes expanded their territories deep into central Asia. The 
wall extension reinforced the defence of the Gansu corridor, a natural 
route that connected Changan, the capital of Han China, to the deserts of 
central Asia. Merchants and caravans had established a trade route, known 
as the Silk Road, along this corridor leading into areas in Central Asia and 
India. Those traveling along the Silk Road were frequently under attack by 
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3.10   Rubbings being made of the Ming 
dynasty Great Wall at Jinshanling, 
Heibei, 1990, for Xu Bing's art work 
Ghosts pounding the Wall.
3.11   Ghosts Pounding the Wall, 1990-91. 
Rubbing on paper. 
 Installation view from the exhibition 
"Three Installations by Xu Bing" at the 
Elvehjem Museum of Art, 
 University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
November 20, 1991 to January 19, 
1992.
the Xiongnu, the powerful nomadic tribe that dominated Mongolia and 
Southern Siberia, as well as other Mongolian and Tibetan marauders.12 The 
Han Emperor had built a thousand kilometres of defence wall to secure 
the trading route.
After the Han dynasties (202 BC – 220 AD), the Three Kingdoms period 
(220-280 AD) and the Western Jin (265-316 AD), China experienced 
300 years of barbarian invasions and occupations. The fall of the Western 
Jin dynasty exposed China’s weaknesses: the Great Wall was inadequate 
protection against the barbarians and the nation was troubled by internal 
power struggles. Moreover, the Confucian-based autocracy was led by 
inadequate rulers—the emperor was pathetic, his ministers corrupt. In 581 
AD, Yang Jian rose to power, unified China and formed the Sui dynasty. He 
restored order by renovating the Great Wall and constructed an enormous 
capital city in Changan, near the site of the former Western Han capital. 
The Tang dynasty replaced Sui in 618 AD. The Tang emperors believed 
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3.12 (Above and Apposite) 
 
 These maps show the relation-
ship of the Great Wall and the 
Chinese national boundary in 
history. The Great Wall was 
never very effective in keeping 
out nomadic invaders.
Shang  1700-1025 BC Western Zhou   1025-771 BC Eastern Zhou  771-256 BC
Qin   221-206 BC Western Han   206 BC - 24 Eastern Han   25-220
Period of the Three Kiingdoms   220-280 Western Jin   265-316 Eastern Jin   317-430
Southern and Northern Dynasty 420-589 Sui   581-618 Tang   618-907
major nomadic tribal territory Chinese territory
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Ten Kingdom  907-960 Liao 947-1115 Northern Song  960-1127
 Southern Song  1127-1279 Yuan   1260-1368 Ming  1368-1644
Ming 1368-1644 Qing   1644-1911 Foreign Influence  1839-1911
Second Sino-Japanese War  1937-1945 Civil War   1927-1949 People’s Republic of China  1949 - present
USSR Occupation British Occupation Japanese Occupation French and British Occupation
French Occupation German Occupation the Great Wall
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3.13  (Above and Opposite) 




Painted and stamped, 
ink and colour on paper
19.1 (h) x 332 (l) cm
Collection of the National Mu-
seum of China
in expansion, not sedentary defence, and thus halted any renovation or 
inspection of the Wall, choosing to concentrate on building a powerful 
army instead. After much military success and territorial expansion for 
the Tang, the Great Wall lost its value—it sat too far inland, too far from 
the expanded border. The Tang rulers allowed it to decay for they saw the 
Wall as a monument from an inferior age. However some Tang poets saw 
the partly-ruined Wall as a memorial to the Han battlefields that allayed 
the grief of people departing Tang China for the barbarian lands beyond. 
Here is the poem, “Looking Towards an Inner Gate of the Wall” written 
by Tsu Yung: 
My heart sank when I set out from Yen
For the Han camps where bugles and drums sound.
For hundreds of miles a cold light gives
 life to packed snow.
Flags fly on three borders like a rising dawn…
The clouds and mountains carry the Great Wall
 away from the sea…
I throw aside my writing brush 
Challenging destiny like a student who 
 discards his cap.13 
The Mongolians rode to power and established the Yuan dynasty that 
governed China from 1279-1368. The Yuan dynasty was one of the most 
oppressive regimes in China’s history as the Mongol government carried 
out a national policy of discrimination against the Chinese. The population 
was classified into four groups: the most privileged were the Mongol ruling 
class, followed by the Mongol’s allies, inhabitants of northern China and 
lastly, the Southern Chinese who has the lowest social status.14 Rather 
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than building defensive walls to enclose the empire, the Mongols favoured 
continuous territorial expansion and building networks of free trade and 
communication routes—by the end of the Yuan dynasty, China had 1400 
postal stations which used 50,000 delivery horses.15 Although the Mongols 
were inarguably excellent warriors, they lacked political sophistication. 
Yuan China collapsed in 1368 and was replaced by the rebel forces of Zhu 
Yuan Zhang, founder of the Ming dynasty. To restore order in China after 
eighty-nine years of Mongolian rule, Zhu and his successors rebuilt almost 
the entire Great Wall and extended it to its present length. Although the 
Wall proved ineffective in keeping the Mongols—the Oirat Mongol of the 
west, the Tartar Mongols to the north and the Uriyangkhads Mongols—
off of Han soil, without hesitation, Ming emperors carried out the wall 
building mission, for the revival of nationalism. Under the Ming emperors, 
the Wall became a symbol of Chinese culture. The Ming dynasty was the 
last to undertake any large-scale work on the Wall; construction covered 
some 7300 kilometres using greatly improved construction techniques. 
Most of the wall was laid with brick, whereas before many sections were 
made of nothing more than mud. Historian Jonathan Fryer in the Great 
Wall of China, commented on the psychology of wall building in Ming 
dynasty: According to historian Jonathan Fryer,
 
The Ming rulers were among the most active wall builders in 
Chinese history, as if anxious to eliminate the possibility of any 
repetition of the Mongol disaster… The Great Wall seems to 
have become a way of life, a necessary demonstration of the 
barrier between China and the world outside, unreachable in 
spirit if not in fact.16
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 In many ways, Zhu Yuan Zhang resembled the Qin’s Ying Zheng. 
Like Ying Zheng, Zhu was obsessed with autocratic power. He was a self-
centered ruler who enjoyed terrorizing people. For instance, he executed 
anyone who used the Chinese word zeng, which means “monk” because it 
reminded him of a time in his youth when he was forced to dress as a monk 
to escape the Mongolians. Emperor Zhu also established a censorship 
agency as a means to control the public’s thoughts for he was desperate to 
re-establish order in Chinese society. He brought Confucianism back to 
life, but manipulated it to become a philosophy that extinguished human 
desires in exchange for absolute loyalty and servitude to the nation and the 
emperor.            
 In the early Ming dynasty, China had looked ambitiously outward 
mainly to re-establish China’s cultural supremacy. The Yongle Emperor 
(1360-1424), the third Ming emperor, sent out six separate massive fleets 
under the command of Moslem eunuch Zheng He (1371-1433), on the 
mission of cultural diplomacy and glorification. Zheng He’s fleet—each 
ship measured over sixty metres long—sailed off from the east coast 
of China and had reached the coasts of southeast Asia, India, Ceylon, 
Palembang, Aden (South Arabia) and as far as east as the eastern Africa. 
During each voyage, the fleet carried many Chinese treasures, including 
porcelain, silk and jade, to impress and entice trade relations with other 
nations. In return, Zheng He received exotic presents, animals and tributes 
ranging from jewels, spices and herbal medicines to the most stunning of 
all—giraffe from Africa.17 
 The Yongle emperor’s policy of open expansionism was abandoned 
shortly after his death in 1424. Zheng He made his seventh maritime 
expedition under the sponsor of the Xuande emperor (1398-1435) in 
1433, but died during his last voyage. The Xuande emperor’s successor, 
under the influence of their Confucian advisers, took an insular approach 
and abruptly ended maritime expeditions. The Confucian officials saw 
interaction with the outside as a threat to the stability of the Chinese 
society. In order to prevent further expeditions, the emperor destroyed 
records of Zheng He’s voyages, abandoned the shipyards, closed off the 
coastline of China and restricted seafaring activities.18 The emperor’s 
ethnocentric worldview led him to believe China was self-sufficient, that it 
was unnecessary to interact with the outside world. In addition, the threat 
of the Mongols along the northern border and the presence of Japanese 
pirates along the eastern coastline further encouraged the emperor to shut 
down expensive sea missions and foreign trading.19 The Ming emperors 
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3.14   A 19th century German cartoon 
depicts China as the soft giant hid-
ing behind the Great Wall in front of 
the Eight Allied Army of 1899. The 
caption reads, ‘Best Wishes from 
the Chinese Wall!
engaged in extensive wall building, but the Great Wall could not prevent 
the decrepit empire from falling into the hands of corrupted officials. 
In 1644, the Manchu, a non-Han Chinese ethnic tribe in north-eastern 
China, conquered the Ming empire and established the Qing Dynasty. 
China’s ethnocentric worldview remained strong throughout the Qing 
dynasty. Since the 1430s, China had remained in its self-imposed isolation 
as the emperors believed in their economic self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, 
some missionaries and diplomats were able to make connection with this 
closed nation, such as the Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, who stayed in China 
from 1582-1610. Ricci succeeded in gaining respect and acceptance by 
adapting to the Chinese society and learning the language. He immersed 
himself in Confucian philosophy and attempted to accommodate 
traditional Chinese beliefs and Confucian philosophy into his Roman 
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Catholic teachings. By doing that, Ricci eliminated the ethnocentric 
authorities’ worries of foreign threats to the pre-eminence of the Chinese 
culture.20 
 Although trade relations between China and the West remained 
active from the middle of the 18th century, they were strictly controlled 
by the imperial government. The Qing government had little interest in 
expanding their foreign trade even though demand on the Chinese goods, 
such as tea, silk and porcelain was high in the Western market, especially 
in the Great Britain. In 1757, the Qing government made trade more 
difficult for Westerners by restricting foreign trade exclusively to Canton 
city. The British merchants found it very difficult to maintain fair trade 
agreements with China especially when the Chinese had no interest to 
European products until the British introduced them to opium. Opium 
exports allowed the British access to a larger Chinese market—they could 
now sell to corrupt officials and poorer commoners. Qing officials soon 
3.15  Technical drawings of the Great  
Wall by Lieutenant Henry Wil-
liam Parish of the British Royal 
Artillery, 1793. Parish travelled to 
China with Lord Macartney as 
part of the first British embassy 
to the Qing court.
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3.16  Chinese soldiers marching along the 
Great Wall in early 1937.
3.17  The cross section shows the solid 
mud core of the Wall.
realized the negative effects of opium and tried to ban it. The abrupt ban 
of opium in China angered the British, and it led to the First Opium 
War (1839-1842). The Qing lost the war to the Anglo-Franco armies 
who exposed weaknesses in the Chinese military; after so many years 
of self-enclosure, China’s military technology was significantly inferior 
to the West. Thereafter, the Qing emperor was forced to open China’s 
doors by allowing foreign trades at ports in coastal cities such as Tianjin 
and Shanghai because of foreign domination. Yet, the cultural tensions 
between the Chinese and the West were still heightened. Westerners saw 
China as an underdeveloped nation while the Chinese saw the Westerners 
as “barbarians” who knew nothing but military force. China’s hatred 
of Westerners climaxed in the late 19th century and led to the Boxer 
Rebellion Incident (1899-1901). A group of commoners called the 
Boxers was formed and attacked Western establishments on Chinese soil. 
The Qing government did little to stop the riots and crack down on the 
Boxers, thereby giving the foreign powers excuses to launch their armies 
into China. They entered from Tianjin and eventually marched into the 
Forbidden City of Beijing. The Eight Nation Alliance, which included 
Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, United States 
and Russia, took advantage of the invasion and each gained control of 
certain regions in northern China. Hostile relations between China and 
the West continued until the end of World War I when most of the foreign 
nations, except Japan, agreed to end their colonization of China. 
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3.18  Ma Liuming
 Fen-Ma LiuMing Walks on the 
Great Wall, 1998
 Chromogenic photograph
 Artist Ma Liuming took the Great 
Wall as a backdrop for his nude 
performance. 
 It was an expression of personal 
freedom and was primarily about 
his own gender conflict regard-
ing his female facial features and 
male body.The Great Wall served 
as an emblem of the conserva-
tism Ma sought to subvert.
 Since the fall of dynastical China, the Great Wall was no longer 
used for defensive purposes. It was not considered as part of China’s 
national identify and thus was not maintained. Instead, the image of the 
Great Wall became metaphorically used by Westerners to describe China’s 
isolation and insularity like Felix Greene’s The Wall Has Two Sides (1963), 
Alberto Moravia’s The Red Book and the Great Wall (1968), Grover Clark’s 
The Great Wall Crumbles (1971), and James H. William’s Bringing Down 
the Great Wall (1991), to name just a few. It was not until the 1930s that 
the Great Wall became a symbol of nation pride to rally around. In 1933, 
Japanese troops attacked and took the Great Wall region, Shanhaiguan, in 
the Hebei province. As an important battle site in the Sino-Japanese War, 
the image of the Great Wall appeared widely in press and propaganda 
materials.21 The Great Wall propaganda was further boosted by China’s 
father of Communism, Mao Zedong (1893-1976). In 1935 he made a 
rallying announcement to his Communist revolutionaries  and said, 
“You’re not a real man if you’ve not been to the Great Wall”—a statement 
that now appears on T-shirts, sunhats and other Great Wall souvenirs.22 
Since then, the Great Wall has continued to be a symbol of national 
unity. In 1984, the Communist party’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping (1904-
1997), announced a new slogan for the Great Wall: Love China, Restore 
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Our Great Wall. From the mid-1980s onward, tens of millions of yuan 
were poured into the wall’s restoration. Deng promoted the Great Wall 
to become China’s national symbol and its number one tourist attraction. 
Deng’s government rebuilt sections of the wall north of Beijing, using it as 
a showpiece for trade delegations and an emblem of national unity during 
a time of social change and economic reform. 
 
Despite changing regimes and shifting politics, the Great Wall has always 
maintained its purpose—national unity, either physically or metaphorically. 
But a wall always has two sides, and it is important to recall the Great 
Wall’s contrasting memories and meanings. The rise of the Wall not only 
parallels the rise of Chinese autocracy but also the downfall of millions 
of people who sacrificed their lives for the construction, not to mention 
the tens of millions of people who were persecuted in China’s repressive 
dynasties. If the Great Wall is to retain its greatness in the future, let it also 
serve as a memorial to China’s deceased and oppressed. 
People pride themselves on the fact that [the Great Wall] is 
the only feat of human engineering visible to astronauts on 
the moon. People even wish to use it as a symbol of China’s 
strength. But if the Great Wall could speak, it would very 
frankly tell its Chinese grandchildren that it is a great and 
tragic gravestone forged by historical destiny…  it can only 
represent an isolationist, conservative and incompetent defence 
and a cowardly lack of aggression… Alas, O Great Wall, why 
do we still want to praise you?
    - Deathsong of the River, 1988
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The Consecrated Site
House of Memory #1, 2005.
by: angela chan
View of the entrance to the proposed 
new secular grotto, located right next to 
the existing religious grottoes, to house 
the memory of the lost tribe. Digital 
Image.
I began to wonder the significance of “Chineseness” in the Chinese culture 
after my visit to the Yungang Grottoes in 2004. The history of the Grottoes 
and their statues and architecture shows a sophisticated cultural fusion when 
the Mongols penetrated through the Great Wall and brought in new ideas to 
subtly enrich the Chinese culture. 
 
The Yungang Grottoes, stretching 1 kilometre long, are clusters of Buddhist 
cave-shrines carved in the sandstone cliff of the Wuzhou mountain range in 
the northern part of Shanxi province, China. They were constructed during 
the Northern Wei period (386-534) when northern China was taken over 
by the non-Chinese tribe called the Tuoba Turks, a tribe of Xianbei origin. 
In order to gain respect and control of the local Han Chinese who considered 
outsiders as “barbarians,” the early Tuoba Emperors accepted the local 
Buddhist religious beliefs and assimilated into the Chinese culture successfully 
by adopting Chinese customs, language and administration. In 460, the third 
Emperor Xiaowen commissioned a monk to take charge of the construction 
of Yungang Grottoes in which five of the statues were made to honour the 
first five emperors in the form and expression of a Buddha.  
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The House of Memory, is a proposal of a new addition of a secular grotto 
to the existing 252 Buddhist cave-shrines in the Yungang Grottoes to house 
the memory of the lost tribe, the Tuoba Turks. After they passed through the 
Chinese northern frontier, the Tuoba people have been largely sinicized and 
merged with the Han Chinese populace in a few generations. This Mongol 
tribe no longer exists today. The proposed design of a secular grotto attempts 
to commemorate the people and shift the attention from the religious and 
political figures to the forgotten people.  In the past, the ancient emperor 
manipulated Buddhism to become a testament to the grandeur and austerity 
of his political power on this sacred site. Today, a secular grotto is proposed 
to be built right next to the existing religious grottoes as a memorial site to 
house the memory of the lost tribe and to remember the history of cultural 
fusion. This proposal is intended to be imaginary and unrealized as inspired 
by the German artist Horst Hoheisel  who once mentioned, “an unfinished 
memorial process can guarantee the life of memory.”    
House of Memory #2, 2005.
by: angela chan
 
The void in commemoration of the lost 
tribe. Digital image.
A beam of light and the shadow of the 
horse motif move with the sun across 
the interior space throughout the day. 
The interior space, dim and hollow, is 
terraced down into a void, which creates 
a sense of lost soul. 
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IV   Wall of Pride and Sorrow
 To build new walls, and to take others down
 To dig under one wall, and to jump above another
 To lean against one wall, and to sit on another
 To walk along one wall, and to run against another
 To see shadows through one wall, and see one self in another
 To be protected by some walls, and to sense the violence of other ones
 To feel the stability of one wall, and to fall with another
 To laugh about some walls, and to cry about others
 To whisper into one wall, and to hear the screams from others
 To believe in one wall, and to hate another
 To commemorate some walls, and to forget others
 To see names [etched] into one wall, and to be one on another
 To live within own walls, and to destroy someone else’s
 To THINK about one wall, and some of the others.1
 Eva Schone, “Thinking of Walls” 
 
Every wall has two sides. Eva Schone’s poem Thinking of Walls awakens our 
conscience to think and see the world from both sides of the wall.
 The following chapter presents a two-sided story of contemporary 
China: the utopian promising land and the harsh reality of a developing 
nation. Part One consists of  “Wall of Pride,” a timeline that shows the 
utopia envisioned by the authorities, as depicted from cover images of 
the pro-Party magazine, Beijing Review, and from a selection of Beijing’s 
significant architectural projects in the same period.
 In the 80s, the Beijing Review focused primarily on promoting 
Deng Xiaoping’s modernization principles and the Party’s socialist ideals. 
Soldiers, civil servants, and teachers were depicted as model citizens. 
Around the time of the June Fourth Movement in 1989, the magazine 
shifted its attention onto the nation’s economic reform. Meanwhile, 
Beijing also saw the realization of many hotel projects, some of which were 
the first joint venture design projects involving foreign design practices, 
signifying the country’s willingness to open itself to foreign businessmen 
and professionals.
 In the 90s, as China began to welcome the success of an open 
market economy, the Beijing Review shifted its emphasis towards national 
unity, cultural awareness and China’s leading role among third-world 
countries. In the same period, shopping centres and commercial buildings 
redrew the skyline of the capital, while local architects struggled to find a 
modern design aesthetic of the Chinese identity. “Big roof” architecture, 
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a trend that puts traditional Chinese roofs on top of modern skyscrapers, 
became the most common design solution for institutional buildings in 
Beijing.
 From the year 2000 onwards, the Beijing Review continued to 
showcase China’s growing confidence through writings on its economy, 
global politics and technological advancement. These images of prosperity 
reminded readers largely of Deng’s famous motto, “To get rich is glorious.” 
Gigantic architectural projects by world renowned architects dominated 
Beijing’s architectural scene, making the city a showcase of national glory.
 Part Two of this section presents an alternate view of the Chinese 
society through a depiction of social issues that have been all but ignored 
by official publications: slavery, AIDS, e-waste, pollution, social inequality 
and poverty. These problems are common knowledge in China despite 
the lack reporting from official media agencies. Many officials regard such 
critical social issues as unavoidable phenomenon as a result of the powerful 
economic growth of the nation. Despite urging from the highest officials in 
the central government to tackle some of these issues, regional authorities 
tend to keep their eyes shut as long as their status and wealth are secured. 
In many cases, social problems in remote areas are intentionally covered 
up by local authorities, and even Beijing’s central government finds them 
difficult to unearth. If the central government has only one nightmare, it 
will likely be the social instability erupting from a remote corner in the 
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People’s Liberation 
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The Great Wall Hotel
completed in 1984
Architectural area of 82,900 m2
Beijing Concert Hall
completed in 1985
Architectural area of 8000 m2
Fragrant Hill Hotel 
completed in1982
Architectural area of 35,000 m2
National Library
completed in 1987
Architectural area of 140,000 m2
Beijing International Hotel
completed in 1988
Architectural area of 105,000 m2
Wangfu Hotel
completed in 1989
Architectural area of 72,000 m2
Sino-Japanese Youth Exchange 
Centre, completed in 1990
Architectural area of 68,000 m2
International Trade Centre
completed in 1990
Architectural area of 420,000 m2
Youyi Shopping Centre
completed in 1992















































The Wall of Pride. The Wall of Propaganda. The Architecture of Pride. A Utopia.
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        1978                1979                1980                1981                1982                1983                1984                1985                1986                1987                1988                1989                1990                1991                1992
China’s fi rst Inter-
net network set up.
Xin Dongan Market
completed in1998
Architectural area of 21,000 m2
Beijing New World Centre
completed in1998
Architectural area of 18,900 m2
Beijing West Railway Station
completed in 1995
Architectural area of 430,000 m2
Capital Library
completed in 1999
Architectural area of 37,000 m2
Bank of China
completed in 2000
Architectural area of 175,000 m2
CCTV
2002-2008
Gross fl oor area of 
470,000 m2
The National Grand Theatre
2002-2007
Building area of 149,500 m2
Beijing National 
Stadium, 2002-2008
Gross fl oor area of 250,000 m2
Jianwai Soho
(housing development 2000-2006)
Gross fl oor area of 700.000 m2
        1993                1994                1995                1996                1997                1998                1999                2000                2001               2002               2003                2004              2005               2006                2007
The Building of 
the Great Fire Wall 
of China begins.
Deng Xiaoping 
passed away and 
Jiang Zemin suc-
ceeds to position 
of supreme power.




protests follow the 
NATO bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade.
The Chinese govern-
ment bans Falun Gong.
The collision between 
an American spy-
plane and a Chinese 
jet fi ghter in China’s 
airspace generates a 
major diplomatic in-






Jiang Zemin begins 
power handover to his 
successor, Hu Jintao.
Anti-Japanese demon-
strations break out in 
cities across China.
“Today ’s Hero :  
They may include 
everyday people, 
not only soldiers 
and Olympic 
champions l ike 
Liu Xiang” Apri l  
2005
“Economic Gala :  
Fortune Global 
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Reportage on slavery broke out in 2007. Migrant workers, children and 
mentally retarded workers were forced to work in brick kilns without pay 
in Shanxi province. Some of these people were kidnapped from train and 
bus stations or attracted by bogus off er of good pay. Many of them had 
horrifi c wounds on their bodies. Th ese workers in remote provinces were 
found working in brutal conditions. 
“In the mid-1990s, the poor peasants in Henan 
province in eastern China sold their blood 
for 50 yuan a pint, enough to buy two bags of 
fertilizer. As a result of unsafe procedures, large 
numbers were infected with the HIV virus. In 
some villages up to 40 percent of the inhabitants 
are seropositive, but for a long time have been 
isolated from help because the existence of Aids 
in China was not offi  cially acknowledged. Today, 
many villagers are still uncertain whether they are 
infected and cannot aff ord a test, which cost 80 
yuan. Organized help from local health authorities 
is getting underway, but many people do not have 
the money to go to hospital and are cared for by 
family and friends.”
 - Photojournalist Lu Guang, 2006
“Guiyu in the Guangzhou province has been a popular dump 
site of computers and electronic appliances from the fi rst 
world countries. Every year, millions of unwanted computer 
parts, keyboards, television sets and cell phones are smuggled 
into China by cargo ships. Villagers abandon their farmlands. 
Th ey shift through piles of broken old computer parts in acid 
smelling shacks, smelt down parts with basic tools to extract 
valuable metals such as gold and copper.”
- Photojournalist Natalie Behring, 2005
“Zhou Mao sold his blood three times 
in order to raise the money to send 
his fi ve children to school for one 
semester. He has been ill for three 
years and his children have now left 
school to take care of him.”
- Photojournalist Lu Guang, 2006
The Wall of Sorrow. The Wall of Consequences. The neglected people. The reality.
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Beijing municipal authorities have shut down more than 50 
schools for children of migrant workers, according to Human 
Rights Watch. Th e schools’ closure - part of a campaign to 
close all unregistered schools for migrants by the end of 
September, 2007, threatens to leave tens of thousands of 
children without education.
 
In 2006, photographer Peter Parks captured 
the image of cyclists riding through a cloud 
of greenhouse gas emitted from a factory in 
Yutian, China. 
In the summer of 2007, a man collects dead fi sh in Donghu 
Lake in Wuhan, where offi  cials say an estimated of 30,000 kg 
of fi sh have been killed by pollution and hot weather.
“An average of 27 people per day lose a body part in the facto-
ries of Shenzhen alone. Nationwide there are 136,000 deaths 
annually in industrial accidents.”
- Photojournalist: Alessandro Digaetano, 2005
“I discovered the great industrial centres of the 
north of China. Th e cities were living through 
the full impact of the reforms, with apocalyptic 
eff ects on the social landscape. Everyone’s eyes 
were turned toward the coast, so it seemed to 
me, therefore, that it was crucial to work on an 
unknown aspect of contemporary China.”





Actually, it [the Great Wall] never did more than kill the many 
workers who labored on it; nor did it ever stop the northern 
barbarians…I have always felt there was a Great Wall enclosing me. 
The material making up this Great Wall consists both of ancient 
bricks and of newly added ones. These two things have joined 
together to create the wall which surrounds us. When will we ever 
stop adding new bricks to the Great Wall? 1
- Lu Xun, 1925
V   T H E  Y E A R N I N G S
 As previously discussed, the Great Wall represents not only the 
pride of a unified China, but also sorrow for the dead and the persecuted 
throughout the Middle Kingdom’s history of despotism. Under the 
combined weight of pride and sorrow, ancient China developed an insular 
culture, implanted in the Chinese psyche and passed from one generation 
to another. Within the boundaries of this culture, a mature social hierarchy 
was established between ruler and citizen, teacher and student, old and 
young, husband and wife. Filial piety – respect and general dominance 
of elders – was the principle that governed not only family life, but also 
political life. This principle, derived from Confucianism, became the 
art of autocratic ruling, as constant as the northern star. Obedience and 
submission to power were traits that became part of the glorified national 
character for maintaining state harmony and deference to tradition. The first 
part of this essay investigates how Confucianism has been adulterated and 
manipulated by the authoritarian government to denounce individualism, 
evolution, and political transparency. The second part of the thesis analyzes 
the effects of the walled culture on China’s national psychology through the 
voices of contemporary social critics and writers in the early 20th century: 
Lu Xun in the 1920s, Bo Yang in the 1960s, and Su Xiaokang and Wang 
Luxiang in the mid-1980s. These intellectuals attempt to re-evaluate their 
culture and voice the problems of national character, and they all share 
one yearning in their efforts: a hope for change from the heart of each 
individual.
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In man’s original state, Huang [Zongxi] says, there were no rulers. 
Each man took care of himself and left others alone... The first 
rulers to appear were men who attempted to remedy this defect, 
seeking not their own good but the benefit of others. These sage-
kings taught men the arts of civilization, saw to it that their people 
had sufficient land from which to gain sustenance and clothing, 
established customs and ceremonies which would regulate their 
social intercourse, maintained schools for their education and moral 
training, and instituted military service for the common defense…
In ancient times the people had been the hosts, the proprietors of 
the land, while the ruler was merely a guest on good behavior. Since 
the rise of the great empires, however, the ruler had become the host 
and the people the guests, possessing nothing in their own right…2
- W.T. De. Bary, 1957
There have been great debates since the late-Qing era over what caused 
the downfall of Chinese civilization. A number of modern scholars have 
argued that Confucianism played an integral role in constructing a wall 
that obstructed China from moving beyond medievalism. A philosophy 
based on autocratic ruling and moral development, Confucianism 
emerged as a resolution to end the chaotic Spring-Autumn Period (770–
476 BC) and Warring States Period (475– 221 BC). Confucius advocated 
self-control, social harmony, and a recovery of the rituals and order of the 
Western Zhou – the Golden Age when China was unified. His ideas can 
be classified into two main parts, ren (仁) and li (禮). Ren has multiple 
meanings: benevolence, self-refinement, and humanism. These qualities 
form the basis of Confucian morality. Li, on the other hand, is Confucian 
order. It emphasizes social hierarchy, societal stability, righteous behaviour, 
and underscores the use of rituals to express the unreachable status of the 
ruler.
 Confucianism was largely ignored until the Western Han 
dynasty (206–8 BC), when Emperor Wu, Liu Che, and Confucian 
master, Dong Zhongshu, aligned with each other. In 140 BC, the 
seventeen-year old Emperor Wu summoned over a hundred famous 
scholars to his court to discuss how to reshape state rule so it would 
resemble Western Zhou, the golden age of the prehistoric sage kings. 
Dong Zhongshu presented his ideas on the relationship between heaven 
and humankind. He suggested that the absolute power of the ruler is a 
divine mandate signified by harmonious relationships between rightful 
Confucianism |  Backbone of the Walled Culture
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ruler and loyal public, and human and nature. He also believed that 
an improperly-ruled society brought disorder to the universe in the 
form of natural disasters. Dong advocated ren, yi, li, le (benevolence, 
loyalty, order and rituals) as the mechanisms for ruling. Furthermore, 
he emphasized three filial relationships: ruler and ruled, father and son, 
and husband and wife, in which the latter parties were to show their 
obedience and loyalty to the former. In Dong’s words, “this rule won’t 
change as long as the heaven doesn’t.”3 Under this concept, everything, 
including people, were the personal belongings of the ruler, the Son of 
the Heaven (天子). Dong’s ideas were strongly supported by Emperor 
Wu. Almost immediately, the emperor abandoned all other schools of 
thought and made Dong’s Confucianism the national philosophy of 
China. Liu’s decision had horrific consequences for the Chinese over 
the next two thousand years; from then on, new political thought was 
often considered a challenge to the autocratic power and was largely 
suppressed. The filial hierarchy in Confucianism became a psychological 
wall that bound the entire Chinese population under the power of the 
emperor and shadow of the prehistoric sage kings. 
 It was not until the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279) 
that Confucianism had a major paradigm shift, resulting in the School 
of Li (理). The School of Li wanted a renaissance of pre-Qin (pre-221 
BC) Confucian literature. The Li masters interpreted the classical texts 
to construct a philosophy centered on nationalism, conservatism, and 
pacifism. They attempted to explain Confucianism purely through 
morality and ethics, thus developing a society that would be controlled 
largely by the elite scholar class. With the help of Yi, the Book of Changes, 
the School of Li merged the laws of nature and morality. Li, the moral 
law, came to mean tai chi, the Supreme Ultimate that controlled yin and 
yang and the five elements. According to the School of Li, both nature and 
humanity was ruled by a single set of virtues – the Confucian morality. 
“Heaven is Law,” 4 wrote Zhu Xi, the most significant representative of the 
School of Li. Bound by a set of moral rules, a man’s most important duty 
was to refrain from any immoral actions and to restrain his inner desires in 
order to resemble the virtues of the sage. 
 Confucianism was politicized to become a philosophy that told 
people what not to do in support of authoritarian power. The School of 
Li obtained its orthodox status in the late Southern Song era, maintained 
its influence during the Yuan (1271–1368 ), and flourished in the Ming 
dynasty (1368–1644 ). Under these neo-Confucian decrees, the Ming 
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dynasty, often referred to as the “walled era”, became the most introverted 
and self-restrained period in the Chinese history. 
 After the decline of Ming dynasty, Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), 
a neo-Confucian political philosopher, gave a profound critique of China’s 
autocratic walled culture in A plan for the Prince. Huang has been likened 
to John Locke and John Stuart Mill for his belief that “the state is created 
for man, not man for the state.”5 In his book, Huang suggested that the 
interests of people should be the driving force behind governmental 
actions. He supported the use of constitutional law to limit the power of 
the ruler, and the restoration of the prime minister as the “servant of the 
people” to balance the emperor’s power. However, as a Confucian master, 
Huang remained a supporter of monarchism, and thus, did not advocate 
democracy. In fact, the exclusive aim of Huang’s ideas was to make the 
emperor a better ruler. Huang also looked to attain social harmony 
under the limits of traditional Confucianism. Although Huang did not 
discourage freedom of expression, he believed that what was right or wrong 
should be determined by Confucian scholars, rather than by the will of the 
common people. Huang’s reforms marked the twilight of Confucianism’s 
self-renewal – in the walled culture, Huang’s ideas had little impact on 
the relatively stagnant 17th century Chinese society. Huang did little to 
overcome the barriers set by previous masters other than asserting people’s 
benevolence. Huang’s failure to reform Confucianism effectively and his 
society reveals how mature the autocracy and the walled culture already 
were by the late Ming/early Qing period. 
Madman | Lu Xun 6
The first large-scale public protest against Confucianism and China’s 
walled culture, happened after the last imperial dynasty of China, the 
Qing dynasty, fell in 1911. During the 1910s and 1920s when China 
was largely controlled by warlords and foreign imperial powers, many 
young, patriotic intellectuals, most of them educated abroad, attempted 
to save their nation from the encroachment of imperialism by promoting a 
movement to change Chinese culture. These early-20th century academics 
made radical reforms in literature and education – the most influential 
of which was the introduction of vernacular Chinese in literature to 
replace classical Chinese which only highly educated people and officials 
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could read. This attempt allowed common people with little education to 
read and understand articles and books. This cultural movement in early 
modern China was known as the May Fourth Movement. The name was 
taken from a 1919 protest against the Versailles Peace Treaty in front of 
the Beijing’s Tiananmen Gate – the treaty had assigned former German 
territories in Shandong to Japan. In face of foreign imperialism and 
humiliation, many intellectuals questioned why a nation which possessed 
four thousand years of history could still be so weak and backward. Lu 
Xun, along with his contemporaries who had been educated abroad in 
the West or Japan, condemned the walled culture and blamed it for the 
country’s downfall. In support of the movement, Lu Xun published a series 
of short stories and essays urging radical cultural change. 
 Lu Xun published the satirical story A Madman’s Diary in 1918. 
The story is based on a madman’s diary, reflecting his vision of the society 
and of the people around him. The madman is actually an enlightened 
individual who can see the problems of the society with critical eyes. He 
is labelled “crazy” by society because he refuses to flow with the crowd; 
because he refuses to conform to power; because he has an independent 
point of view of society. Through the voice of the madman, Lu Xun 
condemned traditional Confucianism for trapping people’s mind using 
the veils of virtue and morality. He described Confucian virtues and 
morality as cannibalistic, likening them with a practice that gradually eats 
up people’s souls: 
Everything requires careful consideration if one is to understand 
it. In ancient times, as I recollect, people often ate human beings, 
but I am rather hazy about it. I tried to look this up, but my 
history has no chronology and scrawled all over each page are 
the words: ‘Virtue and Morality’. Since I could not sleep anyway, 
I read intently half the night until I began to see words between 
the lines. The whole book was filled with the two words – ‘Eat 
people.’ 7
 Why consider virtue and morality cannibalistic? Lu Xun’s 
radical attack on Confucianism is not totally anti-traditional. Similar 
to Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, Lu Xun’s criticism is based on the 
psychological effects on people when virtue and morality are adulterated 
and generalized to become empty formality in a social and political 
context. Hence, virtue and morality often become political tools to repress 
basic human instinct and to promote social and political slavery. Lu Xun 
saw the fundamental problem of the Chinese walled culture residing in the 
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manipulation of Confucian philosophies by the ruling class to dominate 
the common psychology of the people. Not only did these manipulated 
traditional virtues create a society rife with power struggles, suspicion, and 
mutual censorship, but they also strangled the individual’s will to push 
for change in society. Through the madman’s voice, Lu Xun expressed his 
frustration:
Wanting to eat men, at the same time afraid of being eaten 
themselves, they all eye each other with the deepest suspicion. 
How comfortable life would be for them if they could rid 
themselves of such obsessions and go to work, walk, eat, and 
sleep at ease. They have only this one step to take. Yet fathers 
and sons, husbands and wives, brothers, friends, teachers and 
students, sworn enemies and even strangers, have all joined in 
this conspiracy, discouraging and preventing each other from 
taking this step.8
Lu Xun believed if one was determined enough to take this very first step 
to seek change in the society, and if one refused to conform to autocratic 
power, there would be hope in the society. However, Lu Xun observed that 
most people did not want to make such a change and develop themselves. 
Change in Lu Xun’s vocabulary embraced qualities such as self-affirmation 
and self-enlightenment. He believed that social reform must starts from 
change in the individual. True modernity would only arrive when people 
were no longer bound by cannibal-like traditions and learned to think and 
speak up for their rights. He asserts, 
You should change, change from the bottom of your hearts. You 
must realize that there will be no place for man-eaters in the 
world in future.
If you don’t change, you may all be eaten by each other. However 
many of you there are, you will be wiped out by the real men, just 
as wolves are killed by hunters – just like reptiles! 9
 In 1921, Lu Xun wrote another story, The True Story of Ah Q, and 
created a satirical figure, Ah Q, of a poor rural casual labourer who lived in 
a small town at around the time of the 1911 Revolution. Although Ah Q 
lived a miserable life, he could always find ways to make himself feel good. 
Through this character, Lu Xun condemned the self-deceptive quality of 
the Chinese national character. Lu Xun describes Ah Q:
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There are said to be some victors who take no pleasure in a 
victory unless their opponents are as fierce as tigers or eagles: 
in the case of foes as timid as sheep or chickens they find their 
triumph empty. There are other victors who, having carried all 
before them, with the enemy slain or surrendered, utterly cowed, 
realized that now no foe, no rival, no friend is left – none but 
themselves, supreme, lonely, lost, and forlorn. Then they find 
their triumph a tragedy. But not so our hero [Ah Q]: he was 
always exultant. This may be a proof of the moral supremacy of 
China over the rest of the world. 10
Ah Q always felt triumphant because he possessed a mentality called 
“Spiritual Victory,” which Lu Xu found was common in the Chinese. 
Many Chinese during Lu Xun’s time still asserted their cultural superiority 
over the outside “barbarians” after a series of military defeats, and refused 
to acknowledge that other cultures could actually be stronger and more 
advanced than theirs. The Chinese coined the term “Spiritual Victories,” 
which was a little more than unjustified for their victories over outsiders. 
Similarly, when Ah Q despised someone who was better than himself, 
he would use a self-defence mechanism and say, “My sons may be much 
greater” or “He used to be much better off.” Ah Q demonstrated the most 
outrageous method of rationalization after he had been robbed of all the 
money he won in gambling. To maintain a positive self-image, he slapped 
himself as if he had beaten up someone else: 
…[Ah Q] changed defeat into victory. Raising his right hand 
he slapped his own face hard, twice, so that it tingled with pain. 
After this slapping his heart felt lighter, for it seemed as if the 
one who had given the slap was himself, the one slapped some 
other self, and soon it was just as if he had beaten someone else 
– in spite of the fact that his face was still tingling. He lay down 
satisfied that he had gained the victory…11
Through Ah Q, Lu Xun comments on his countrymen’s passive attitude 
toward their fate. This attitude results from the two thousand-year legacy 
of despotism, during which the lives of average citizens were entirely 
dependent on the will of the ruler. Generations of harsh restraint and 
compulsory blind obedience made the people give up on their desire 
for justice and individual rights. This attitude is exemplified in The True 
Story of Ah Q, when Ah Q is about to be executed for a crime he never 
committed:
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Suddenly it occurred to him [Ah Q] – ‘Can I be going to have 
my head cut off?’ Panic seized him and everything turned dark 
before his eyes, while there was a humming in his ears as if 
he had fainted. But he did not really faint. Although he felt 
frightened some of the time, the rest of the time he was quite 
calm. It seemed to him that in this world probably it was the fate 
of everybody at some time to have his head cut off. 12
 Lu Xun’s courage to criticize his own culture is indicative of the 
spirit of the May Fourth Movement and also exposes the psychological 
barrier that hindered modernization. Cries for political and cultural reform 
by the May Fourth scholars flew in the face of China’s tyrannical rulers 
and landowners, marking an era of struggle between the bureaucracy and 
the intelligentsia. The May Fourth scholars emerged as the first to break 
through the Chinese wall of authoritarianism and tradition. They were 
the harbingers of freedom of expression and epitomized determination in 
cultural advancement – two qualities crucial in reviving a civilization in 
decline. 
Ugly Chinaman | Bo Yang
Fifty years after Lu Xun, Bo Yang, a Chinese writer based in Taiwan, 
criticized the culture of the Middle Kingdom more harshly and directly. 
After being imprisoned for nine years in Taiwan because of his critique 
of Chiang Kaishek, Bo Yang came to believe that whomever in China 
told the truth about politics would end up in jail. In the 1980s, Bo Yang 
compiled a collection of his lectures and essays on his criticism of the 
Chinese culture in The Ugly Chinaman and the Crisis of Chinese Culture. 
This book caused a furious debate in the Chinese communities when it 
was first published. Although this book received praises for its honest and 
critical tone, some Chinese disliked Bo for speaking disdainfully about 
his fellow citizens. Nonetheless, Bo’s experience as a political prisoner had 
made him a fearless cultural critic and an advocate of freedom of expression. 
Indeed, the intention of Bo’s book was to make Chinese readers aware of 
the problems in the national character that was leading to the degeneration 
of their culture. He used the metaphor of a soy bean paste (fermented soy 
bean sauce) to describe the effects of walled culture on people:
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[b]ecause of their long sojourn in the soy paste vat, Chinese 
people have developed a strong tendency towards resignation. 
On the one hand, they like to brag and exaggerate; on the other 
they’re self-indulgent and self-pitying.13 
 Many Chinese scholars, from the time of Lu Xun to the present, 
have wondered how despotism could be sustained for so long in China. 
Bo Yang suggests that the problems of present generations originate from 
an ideological virus passed down by their ancestors. This virus, according 
to Bo Yang, was nurtured by both dogmatic Confucianists and a despotic 
bureaucracy. Bo Yang argues that it was the slave mentality presented in 
China’s national character that encouraged despotism to last for centuries. 
This mentality is symptomatic of a sense of social inferiority and defeatism 
in the face of power. It denounces individual creativity, imagination and 
the will to change society; it forces people to surrender their feelings and 
desires, prevents alternative social values and ways of living, and defends 
ancient social structures and the mythological ideals of a golden past that 
is no longer relevant. Possession of those submissive qualities made people 
become spineless and selfish: 
Confucius had a brilliant philosophy for avoiding calamities. In 
plain language: ‘Avoid dangerous societies. Don’t live in dangerous 
communities. In times of social stability, take an official position. 
In times of chaos, distance yourself from society. In prosperous 
times, if you don’t take an official position, you should feel shame. 
In bad times, if you have an official position, you should also feel 
shame.’ 14 
Slave mentality searches for universal harmony based on moral limits, 
promotes happiness in accepting fate, praises officialdom and power, 
and encourages mundanity and self-control. This is the mentality of 
the many Chinese who, like Ah Q, refuse to modify their “national” 
behaviour and blindly follow any political regime. Bo Yang asserted that 
this slave mentality was a huge drawback for social development because it 
perpetuated paranoia, a sense of resignation and cowardly behaviour:
Chinese are paranoid to the point where they don’t even 
know what their legal rights are, or how to assert them… The 
psychological environment of neurosis and paranoia I spoke 
of above is a fertile breeding ground for despots and corrupt 
bureaucrats, and there is little hope that particular species of 
human being that flourishes in this climate will soon die out in 
China. In traditional Chinese culture, ‘acting wisely by playing 
it safe’ is praised time and again… This is one reason why the 
Chinese people continue to degenerate and atrophy.15 
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 The concept of slave mentality is common in modern philosophy 
and sociology. Nietzsche introduced the idea of slave mentality in the 
late 19th century to analyze the relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled. Nietzsche thought that those unable to judge for themselves would 
inevitably be ruled by another entity that would design a set of values 
for them to believe. Nietzsche proposed this was how despotic systems 
were established. Therefore, autocracy, according to the theory of slave 
mentality, has been the official religion of China for over two millennia. 
 Bo Yang concludes his analysis of slave mentality with a 
question: Can people raised in a culture that promotes such values think 
independently?16  Chinese authorities have used Confucian filial devotion 
required to maintain social control and to stabilize political power for 
thousands of years, which has bred a submissive national character of not 
to directly criticize and challenge their authority in public. The ugliness 
that Bo Yang saw in his fellow citizens was their slave mentality – their 
reluctance to change. If a modern state could be comprised of people 
who could loosen their thinking from the bindings of Confucian filial 
hierarchy and thus posses the ability to judge their leaders, then China’s 
modernization would not be limited to only shallow glamour. 
The Deathsong of the River
How could China shake its slave mentality, break through its walled 
culture and develop into a modern society based on individual rights 
and freedoms? This question has been raised frequently, whether it be 
during the May Fourth Movement in the early 20th century or during 
the political crackdown following the June Fourth Movement in the 
late 20th century. A controversial six-episode documentary series, co-
written by Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, raised this topic for debate. 
The documentary series titled Heshang, translated as The Deathsong of 
the River, was broadcasted on television in 1988 during a time when an 
unusual number of policies of non-interference in literary matters was 
in effect in China. In the film, the national symbols were revaluated 
in a critical view point: the Great Wall, which had been the national 
and cultural identity of unity, was discredited to become the symbol of 
cultural suffocation that hindered development while the dragon, the 
symbol of the emperor, was reinterpreted as a symbol of destruction 
and fear. Like Lu Xun’s Madman Diary and Bo Yang’s Ugly Chinaman, 
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the Deathsong of the River presented a strong desire for change and great 
eagerness to attack totems of the narrow nationalism. 
 The Yellow River received the most complex criticism as a 
metaphor in the Deathsong of the River. The Yellow River, the second-
longest river in China and fifth longest in the world, is considered the 
cradle of Chinese civilization. It got its name from its yellow soil, and also 
because China’s legendary first ruler was named the Yellow Emperor. The 
Yellow River carries about 1.6 billion tons of silt per year from the loess 
plains to the sea. As it dissects the plains of Northern China, it deposits 
silt wherever the current slows, and thus raises the riverbed, which causes 
cyclic flooding and changes in the river’s course. What nurtured the yellow 
civilization also proved to be its most destructive force. 17 
Dragons, the gods of rivers and seas, are associated with the destructive 
Yellow River. As dragon worship dominated the Yellow River basin in 
prehistoric times, fear and respect toward the unpredictable Yellow River 
was typical. According to written records from 602 BC to AD 1938, the 
Yellow River broke its embankments 1,590 times – about twice every three 
years, and has changed its course significantly twenty-six times, about once 
a century.18 The cyclic floods of the Yellow River have filled the lakes in the 
Northern Chinese Plains with silt, submerged cities, farmlands and hills. 
The mighty Northern Song capital Bianliang, also known as Kaifeng, is 
now about ten metres below the yellow soil.19 The once prosperous city 
of China depicted in Zhang Zeduan’s painting, Crossing the River During 
the Qingming Festival, that had a population of over one million people 
was lost forever. The Yellow River never tires of changing the Chinese 
landscape. 
 Su and Wang, in Deathsong of the River, argued that this 
phenomenon paralleled the chaotic socio-political history of China: every 
two to three hundred years, a significant and violent upheaval would occur 
and result in the fall of a dynasty.20 Bo Yang in The Ugly Chinaman also 
pointed out that there was not a single year in the imperial eras that China 
was not engaged in warfare, large or small. 21 Societal upheavals have been 
almost as unavoidable as the flooding of the Yellow River. Since Chinese 
rulers used to associate themselves with dragons, representations of the 
fierce Yellow River, then the Yellow River can also be seen as an icon of 
Chinese despots. Throughout the last two millennia, the Chinese people 
have been largely subject to the behaviour of their rulers, as threatening as 
the Yellow River. 
 In the imperial times, people dreamed for the Yellow River to 
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run clear. There are legends claiming that if a sage is born, the Yellow 
River will turn clear, something that had never happened before. In the 
20th century, the fate of Chinese people was still largely dependent on the 
unpredictable ruling class. Su and Wang suggested that what the Yellow 
River could give the people had already been given to their ancestors. The 
Yellow River supported China’s civilization since ancient times – the sand 
and mud accumulated by the river flowed through the blood vessels of 
the Chinese. But, it was time to flush the river deposits away with a great 
tidal wave, because its mud and sand had choked the vessels of people. 
The Yellow had become an iconic Confucianist barrier for contemporary 
Chinese, one which Su and Wang asked contemporary Chinese to turn 
their backs on:
Confucian culture may indeed possess all sorts of ancient and 
perfect “gems of wisdom”, yet over these past few thousand years 
it has been able to create neither a national spirit of initiative, 
nor a legal order for the state, nor a mechanism for cultural 
renewal; rather on its path of decline it has created a frightening 
sort of suicidal mechanism, which repeatedly destroys its own 
best talent, killing off the living elements within itself, and 
suffocating one generation after another of the finest flowers 
of our nation. Though it may possess a thousand-year’s treasure 
hoard of gems, in today’s world we may be forced to throw out 
the gems together with the junk.22
 The message in the film is direct and clear: Su and Wang take the 
position that if the Yellow River, which no longer nurtures the people, the 
Chinese have to give up their long-held fears and respect for the Yellow 
River and find new ways to accept change and embrace modernity as 
found in the West. To conclude the documentary, Su and Wang identify 
“blueness” as the ultimate resolution for China. Here, “blueness” refers 
to the colour of the ocean, which represents a civilization, “like that 
of ancient Greece or modern Europe… industrial, seafaring, outward-
looking and aggressive” as opposed to China’s “yellow” civilization, 
which is “characterized by political despotism and by a monistic, ethical 
creed that forbids diversity.”24 Perhaps, the film presented a naïve desire 
for westernization. However, the film is so emotionally charged that 
it becomes a piece of art. The yearning for change and westernization 
reflects the frustration and anger towards the downfall of a culture. The 
film shows a strong desire to escape from the mystified national symbols. 
The episode ends  with a hymn of hope for the union of the Yellow River 
and the blue ocean: 
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 In the Deathsong of the River, Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang 
indicate a deep despair, a frustration, a feeling of “extreme anger and 
sorrow, in a sort of self-awareness and self-condemnation.”25  This sense of 
frustration is also common in Lu Xun and Bo Yang’s works. Intellectuals 
in China have always placed themselves at the border of the society.26 Their 
border identity allows them to detach themselves from the social norms 
and develop an independent voice that remains true to themselves. Their 
border-identity also allows them to understand the two worlds: one within 
the border and one outside the border. At the borderline, they dream of 
connecting the two worlds and bringing in the “good elements” that they 
have never experienced before; but this dream has been suppressed within 
the border:
Among the professions of mankind, no one has a greater need for 
a free atmosphere and unlimited space than they [intellectuals] 
do. If you affixed a black cross  to their spirits or weighed them 
down under a grey Great Wall, then the light of their spirit would 
never become the sun! May History never again play tracks on 
Chinese intellectuals. Today, this is our deepest prayer!” 27
   - The Deathsong of the River, 1988.
We are right now moving from opacity to transparency. 
We have already moved from the closed to the open door. 
The Yellow River is fated to traverse the yellow soil plateau. 
The Yellow River will ultimately empty into the blue sea.
The Yellow River’s suffering and its hope have made it great.
The Yellow River’s greatness perhaps consists in the fact 
 that it has created a stretch of land between the sea and the plateau.
The Yellow River has now reached its great and painful entryway into the sea.
The mud and sand it has carried thousands of li will collect here to form new land.
The surging waves of the sea will here meet head on with the Yellow River.
The Yellow River must eliminate its fear of the sea.
The Yellow River must preserve the dynamism and undaunted resolve 
 witch comes from the plateau.
The waters of life arise from the sea and flow back into the sea.
After a thousand years of solitude, the Yellow River has finally seen the blue sea.23
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In 1975, Psychologist Martin Seligman established his model of learned 
helplessness, a theory of depression. Learned helplessness was referred to 
as a condition in which an individual adopted a belief in his or her own 
helplessness and ceased to believe in the potential worth of his or her own 
actions to influence any life-situation positively. 
 In one of the studies that established the learned helplessness 
paradigm, Seligman worked with three groups of dogs. In the first phase 
of the experiment, Group 1 received shocks that would turn off if they 
responded actively; Group 2 received shocks they could not turn off no 
matter what action they took; and Group 3 received no shocks at all during 
Phase 1. 
 After several Phase 1 trials, Seligman placed each group of dogs in 
an enclosed box, divided in half by a chest-high fence, from which there was 
no escape. A shock would then come on, and if the dogs jumped over the 
barrier to the other side, then the shock would stop. The dogs in Group 1 
and Group 3 quickly learned to avoid getting shocked in Phase 2, but the 
dogs in Group 2, which had prior history of inescapable shock made no 
attempt to jump. They were passive: they made no attempt to jump to avoid 
the shock, withdrew to the corner of the box and lay down.1 
After reading Seligman’s experiment on learned helplessness, it lead me to 
wonder, would the same psyche of helplessness become part of the Chinese 
collective psychology after cycles of social upheaval and repression throughout 
the history of the last century? 
 History has taught the Chinese people that no matter how hard 
they tried, they could never escape from under the hand of an authoritarian 
government. In the 20th century, many novelists, artists, writers, and students 
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attempted to loosen the bindings of authority and the resulting historical, 
cultural, societal, and political restraints. But those moments were like sparks 
that died off quickly after the government’s repression and harsh punishments 
in response to the major civil resistance such as Hundred Flower Movement 
in the 50s, the crackdown of the Democracy Wall in late 70s, and the June 
Fourth Incident in late 80s.
 After the June Fourth Movement in 1989 was curbed, the cry 
for democracy in China appeared to be silenced, at least on the surface. 
The bloody and violent military crackdown on the protest added to the 
psychology of helplessness in the Chinese citizens. Many began to believe 
that they could not do anything to change the suppressed society in terms of 
freedom of expression and bringing about democracy; that it was unrealistic 
to raise further concerns for political liberation and individual freedom.
  A popular slogan in the 90s, wan qian kan: look fully toward the 
future – the future of economic prosperity in place of any desire for political 
change – best reflects the dominant thinking of the people even in today’s 
society.2 Celebrating some parts and forgetting others, the nation turns on 
her full engine to boost its economy while a new wave of nationalism spreads 
across the country. Each year, millions of youngsters in the country flock 
to urban centres for job opportunities. Acres of rural lands are turned into 
gigantic factory compounds and mines. From the coast to the mountains, 
new cities emerge like mushrooms after rain. The rocketing economic 
boom and tremendous growth in GDP keeps the populace contented and 
satisfied, materially. The people understand that in order to sustain the fruits 
of economic success, it is in their best interest not to look back to the past 
with questioning eyes, not to mention the calamitous Cultural Revolution 
and the Tiananmen Square massacre. Rising prosperity and improved living 
standards repress any thoughts that might trigger economic and social 
instability. In the minds of people they know that,
…a socialist culture has no interest in encouraging people to think 
critically or creatively about their past, that wants people to fix 
hopeful eyes on their tomorrows rather than questioning eyes on 
their yesterdays…3
 In the last decade, as the Great Wall stood firm and proud on 
Chinese soil as a tourist attraction and national monument, the government 
erected a new “great” firewall to censor activities in the cyber world. In 
2006, the number of Internet users in China became the second-largest in 
the world with a population of 132 million users, only the United States 
had more users. Nonetheless, the degree of censorship and repression in 
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Chinese cyberspace was like that of other media – magazines, films, books 
and newspapers; it was not limited to only state-mandated filtering and 
Web site closure. Many resourceful Web sites such as the BBC News, CNN, 
and Wikipedia sites were blocked in China. In 2006, the government also 
proposed forcing her 20 million bloggers to register their real names.4 By 
then there was an estimated 30,000-strong Internet police force dedicated 
to monitor Web sites and emails.5 Currently, the country’s 110,000 Internet 
cafés are state-licensed and equipped with surveillance systems.6 It is not hard 
to find news about the arrests of Internet users, accused of being subversive 
and offensive:
Shi Tao, who worked for the Contemporary Business News in 
China, was jailed for 10 years in 2005 for “divulging state secrets”. 
He is believed to have posted an internal Communist Party 
message warning journalists about the dangers of social unrest 
resulting from the return of dissidents for the 15th anniversary of 
the Tiananmen Square uprising. Wang Xiaoning was also given 
a 10 year sentence for “incitement to subvert state power” after 
publishing pro-democracy material online.7 
The government continues to play the cat-and-mouse game with dissidents 
and tightly monitors the activities of her people, repelling any “destabilizing, 
anti-totalitarian flies and mosquitoes of media freedom and democracy.”8 
 Those who dare to challenge the “border” of censorship risk 
surveillance, detention, prosecution, and persecution. When dissidents 
“evaporated,” one after another, the people started to question – where the 
line was drawn between what could be said and what couldn’t. The TV 
documentary, River Elegy, which reflected the legacy of China’s walled culture, 
was denounced as counter-revolutionary, “tricking and deceiving people’s 
hearts” and leading public opinion into political turmoil in 1989.9 In January 
2006, the government shut down a newspaper supplement Bingdian, or 
Freezing Point, for publishing an article written by a professor at Zhongshan 
University on the way history is taught in China.10 Are these accusations 
justified? Does silence equal patriotism? People who honestly questioned the 
crippled socio-political state of their homeland and culture were thought of 
as threats to the nation’s stability—in an open society, such voices would be 
seen as expressions of social conscience. Constant, unreasonable denunciation 
of such efforts could only lead to a culture of fear. No doubt the majority 
of the people continue to exercise vigorous self-censorship to repress their 
thoughts and opinions about their dissatisfaction with society and politics. 
The punitive political culture in contemporary China is no different from 
that in Mao’s epoch that saw “honest questioning and honest disagreement 
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as evidence that questioners and those who disagreed are enemy, traitors” to 
the nation.11 Living in such a culture of political fear, few people would dare 
to raise honest questions concerning the well-being of their country for fear 
of denunciation: 
Comrade Li asked whether production projections are too high. 
He is surely a rightist! Mr. Zhang questioned the validity of 
impossibly high harvest reports. He is surely a weak-kneed rightist! 
Comrade Shen asked whether water projects carried out so swiftly 
and constructed with untrained workers would function properly? 
He dares to question the will and power of the people? He is clearly 
an elitist, a rightist, and a counterrevolutionary.12
 For better or worse, the stability of China is shaped by a group of 
tamed citizens who have learned to play safe in society, never taking the risk to 
express opinions on sensitive topics such as criticisms of leadership, Taiwan’s 
independence, or ethnic minorities in Islamic Xinjiang and Buddhist Tibet. 
Under long years of political repression, most Chinese have unconsciously 
bred a habit of “self-discipline” and “self-censorship” to ensure personal 
safety:
There’s something very potent about Chinese culture; it turns 
restrictions and taboos into immutable and acceptable rules. If they 
were just taboos, the Chinese could easily be rid of them. Even 
today the greatest obstacle to Reform is that the old ways have 
been turned into sacred Truth, and this clouds people’s judgement, 
they assume it is right and proper. The moment you liberate them 
they feel uneasy and oppose their freedom. When feet are unbound 
people fight against it heart and soul; they can’t walk with unbound 
feet anymore. It’s not just that the feet have been bound too long; 
they become their own raison d’être, a self regulation that has also 
become an esthetic in its own right, a value system. Once this 
has happened, you can’t do anything to get rid of it…. The reason 
Reform is making such slow headway is that people don’t dare let 
go of all those things they once found attractive.13
For the time being, the populace is focusing their full energies on earning 
and consuming. They are willing to be bound by the one-party government, 
and to be bewitched by the image of a prosperous nation. The government 
continues to construct the gleaming façade of a great Chinese nation to 
legitimize her authoritarian power and for her people to look up upon: the 
2008 Olympic games, the first Chinese astronaut in space, membership into 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the success in conserving the giant panda, 
the construction of the world’s largest dam and the rocketing economic 
growth. The Chinese government is attempting to create a Chinese utopia. 
But this utopian dream exists “nowhere, except in the imagination.”14 All 
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the talk about ideological unity just means everyone has to have the same 
bound feet; otherwise, you will be branded as a traitor or a rebel.15 The 
opponents of totalitarian utopia are those who ask questions “that [slice] 
through the stage backdrop and gives us a look at what lies hidden behind 
it.”16 And behind the stage are the social realities: the ugly lies of politicians, 
corruption, power struggles, social inequality and fatal environmental 
practices. The suppression of dissidents, the fake milk powder scandal, the 
e-waste problems, the spread of Avian flu and detention of AIDS doctors 
are a few examples of China’s current social problems that the government 
has tried to cover up in the backstage. To create a picture of national unity 
by silencing opposing voices, covering up social problems, and sacrificing 
individual rights, the consequences of these actions may haunt future social 
development and turn into global disaster.  Moreover, to achieve ideological 
unity amongst 1.4 billion people in today’s cyber age and global community 
is a great challenge. The challenges faced by the Chinese government are 
enormous and complex and will require more than slogans and kitsch to 
resolve. 
Level l ing the Wall  Within
Everyone has the spark of individuality; ideological unity is not so 
easily achieved. Unity means the individual has to be manacled, has 
to conform to the pattern. This leads people to despise any spark of 
individuality and individualism. It’s like saying: Get those feet back 
into bindings, otherwise the nation will collapse. Alas, who would 
ever think that humanity could come to this? Who would think 
that people hate natural feet so much?17
- Lin Yutang, 1934
To ensure the minds of her citizens do not become “contaminated” by 
incoming foreign thoughts, China’s government suppresses free expression, 
including art. Many international films that deal with politics are banned in 
China. The German film Lives of Other, was among one of them. Although 
it was banned, the pirated version of the film had been one of the biggest 
hits among intellectuals when it was first released in China’s underground 
market. The film resonated profoundly in the heart of repressed individuals 
who admired the brave transformation of a disciplined party devotee into a 
human with feelings and thoughts in his own right. The movie portrays a 
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yearning that has been long repressed in Chinese society – a hope that one 
day, their nation could face the shadow of the past openly, without being 
overly sensitive and hysterical to topics and incidents seen as infringing on 
their national dignity. 
 In Th e Lives of Others, director Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck 
presents the blossoming moments of humanity’s liberation through an 
individual experiencing the process of intimate exchange and becoming 
exposed to the arts. Set in the suff ocating mid-1980s East Berlin, Gerd 
Wiesler – a Stasi expert in surveillance and interrogation, a devoted 
Communist party member, and disciplined political machine –  is ordered 
by the state minister to bug the apartment of Georg Dreyman, a famous 
playwright, on suspicion of treachery. Wiesler sets up a secret station in the 
attic of Dreyman’s apartment and eavesdrops on the life of Dreyman and 
his actress lover, Christa, twenty-four hours day. Wiesler and his assistant 
record everything they hear on a reel-to-reel recorder and account every 
detail in daily reports with a typewriter. It does not take long for Wiesler 
to fi nd out the real motive behind his mission – the minister’s lust for 
Christa. Wiesler witnesses how the minister threatens to destroy Christa’s 
career if she refuses to comply with his order. Th is disgusts Wiesler and he 
begins to raise questions about the state ideology. At the same time, his 
sympathy and fondness for Dreyman’s life grows stronger each day as he 
hears more about the diffi  culties for artists and intellectuals living within 
this authoritarian society. His repressed heart is gradually softened and is 
opened to allow arts to liberate and touch his emotions. He steals a book 
from Dreyman’s apartment to read a passage of love written by Brecht, 
a German writer. He sheds solitary tear while hearing Dreyman played 
a piano sonata after a friend’s suicide and says, “Can anyone who has 
heard this music — I mean, truly heard it — really be a bad person?” Th is 
signifi cant line from Dreyman echoes the original idea that inspired von 
Donnersmarck to take on this project. Th e director himself was inspired 
by Russian writer Maxime Gorky’s recount of a statement made by Lenin: 
“I don’t want to listen to Beethoven’s Impassionata anymore, even though 
it’s my favourite piece of music. If I listen to it, I will want to stroke 
people’s heads and say friendly things to them. I have to smash in those 
heads to fi nish my revolution.”18 
 Th e director succeeded in creating the same eff ect in his fi lm 
as the piano sonato did to Wiesler: it awakened the audience’s repressed 
emotions and facilitated self-awareness.  Wiesler’s transformation can be 
explained by philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenological account 
6.1  The Lives of Others Movie 
Poster
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of the “face-to-face” encounter. Wiesler’s “face-to-face” encounter with the 
other announces ethical obligation and disrupts political ideologies that 
eradicate humanity.  Ethics comes from his recognition of the face of the 
other. Levinas defines the face as that “whose meaning consists in saying: 
‘thou shalt not kill.’”19 We witness the change of Wielser in his questioning of 
the authority and challenging the predetermined ideologies. It is not difficult 
to see the reason behind China’s ban of this movie. The transformation 
of Wiesler from a state machine to a man who thinks beyond the state’s 
boundary is definitely what the authoritarian government does not want to 
see happening to her citizens. 
The Lives of Others is precisely what it dramatizes – a picture 
about change that is meant to promote change. Looking through 
the Iron Curtain of the past, it shows how a transformed man is 
an essential part of a transforming society: without that man, and 
others like him, levelling the walls within themselves, the literal 
Wall could never have fallen. So, at a time when new walls are 
rising in the dubious name of security, the film doubles as a vital 
reminder about the concreteness of hope, and a stern warning about 
the hopelessness of concrete.20
- Rick Groen, 2007
Heterotopia
In civilizations without boats [heterotopia], dreams dry up, 
espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place 
of pirates.21 
- Michel Foucault, 1986
No matter how hard the government attempts to suppress their existence, the 
voices of dissidents still arise in every corner of the nation as China progresses 
to modernity. State-banned books and films remain widely available in black 
markets. Underground, hidden, anarchic, unpredictable, and uncontrollable, 
the presence of the black market not only serves to challenge existing rules 
and regulations of the government, but also reveals a strong need and desire in 
citizens’ lives for values that conflict with the dominant order. This includes 
wanting arts like literature and films that promote alternative viewpoints and 
ideas of social values and bureaucratic culture. This hidden desire of citizens 
reveals a demand for free thinking and social transformation. The tighter the 
state control is on banned items, the louder the cry of the repressed will be. 
The prevalence of the black market parallels the growing demand for new 
ideas and arousing interest in novelty during China’s rapid modernization. 
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Today, Chinese citizens are sandwiched between state order and individual 
desires for liberalization. The government restricts the society from evolving 
according to the needs of its citizens, and only uses excuses like social stability, 
state revival and nationalism to maintain its authority.
 The authoritarian concept of utopia has not changed since the 
60s. This utopia was constructed upon a set of monolithic political and 
social values, repression of opposing voices, advocacy of blind obedience, 
and denial of social variances. But political longing for wholeness and 
homogeneity proved to be disastrous in the 60s when Mao manipulated 
mass power to eliminate both his real and imaginary enemies in the society 
during the Cultural Revolution:
In a political culture that specialized in rooting out heterodoxy 
through hysterically violent public denunciations and forced 
confessions, where Chinese were pressurized, for their own safety, 
to inform on their neighbours and colleagues, to report on chance 
comments overheard out of open windows, merely having – much 
less expressing – critical thoughts became hazardous.22
Hundred of thousands of intellectuals were censored, denounced and 
humiliated by their friends, neighbours and relatives in Mao’s name. To the 
authorities, the elimination of intelligentsia was a common practice in the 
making of their utopia. Czech novelist Milan Kundera points out that a 
utopia involves creating a gulag alongside for people who don’t fit in: “the 
gulag is a septic tank used by totalitarian kitsch to dispose of its refused.”23 
However, eliminating dissidents is equivalent to shutting off all honest 
suggestions, options for improvement, and public conscience. In the case 
of Mao, after the vicious suppression of the intelligentsia, what remained in 
the “utopian” society were corrupted officials who covered up famines and 
exaggerated industrial success across the country, and billions of confused 
citizens who “lost touch with reality and could no longer see where their true 
interest lay.”24  In the end, the pursuit of utopia became a political haven and 
a societal nightmare.
 The utopian longing for homogeneity deters spontaneous change in 
a society as perfection is predetermined and is set within strict control of the 
authority. In a utopian society, authoritarian rules and order become “perfect” 
standard that governs everyday life, that imprisons human imagination, and 
that prevents possibilities from flourishing outside the realm of societal 
norms. To challenge the utopian concept of homogeneity, Michel Foucault 
employed the term heterotopia, a medical term in Latin originally referring 
to body parts that are out of place, abnormal, or alien-like tumours, to 
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reassert new meanings to incongruous places in society. In his lecture in 
1967, Foucault sought to give the term heterotopia a material referent by 
pointing to various places “whose existence sets up unsettling juxtapositions 
through their strange or ambivalent composition.”25   Foucault included in 
his list of heterotopia such places as prisons and psychiatric hospitals that 
accommodate the deviance; cemeteries and theatres that play as mediating 
space; carnivals and vacation villages that serve as temporal and transitory 
space; hamams and saunas that give restricted access; and brothels that create 
a space of illusion. Foucault’s concept of heterotopia enables us to rethink 
the “multiple forms of deviant and transgressive behaviours that occur in 
urban space” as an inclusion of difference and diversity.25  Hetherington 
summarizes the concept of heterotopia:
The main principle of heterotopia is that they bring together a 
collection of unusual things (or discursive statements), and give 
them a unity of meaning through the production of a space that 
acts symbolically as a site for the performance of an alternate mode 
of social ordering.26 
The alternate ordering within these heterotopic spaces allows alternatives to 
evolve and to challenge the existing dominant practices. For instance, the 
Palais Royal, a social and commercial hub near the Louvre of late 18th century 
Paris, is a heterotopia in which opinions on politics and philosophy were 
generated and exchanged among Parisians of different social classes, who 
came for entertainment, social debate, pleasure, gossips, food, culture and 
politics. It was the Palais Royal that modern ideas of the French Revolution 
gradually took shape, a declaration of liberty, equality and rights of man. As 
argued in Hetherington’s essay, The Palais Royal as Modernity, the features of 
the Palais Royal—the coffee-houses, gardens, arcades and theatres—provide a 
site where people from the highest to lowest social strata mingle together and 
where intellectual culture and consumer culture flourish simultaneously: 
Below the public gardens and promenades were grottoes that housed 
cafes that were used for more seditious purposes; these were places 
where Jacobins and freemasons would meet and plot. In the newly 
built arcades, prostitutes would rent small shops with rooms above, 
in order to be able to provide sex for their clients. Streetwalkers 
would mingle with the fashionable crowds…The bookshops sold 
not only the latest Enlightenment works, political pamphlets, 
newspapers and journals, but alongside them pornography and 
seditious writings.28 
The Palais Royal reveals the urging need for change in the late 18th century 
146 
French society. The desire for change arose from the level of common people, 
and refined through constant discussion among different social classes. It 
was the place where modern man was born, a class of new people who 
acknowledged the importance of social changes and who could voice out the 
real desires and needs of people.
 Another variation of heterotopia can be found in Hannah Hurtzig’s 
Blackmarket project. Hurtzig’s theatre production Blackmarket for Useful 
Knowledge and Non-Knowledge is the epitome of an apolitical heterotopic 
place – a site of exchange and enlightenment. Hurtzig took the concept of 
a black market, a place of anarchic exchange of goods and created a venue 
for knowledge exchange in areas difficult to acquire in daily life: politics, 
cultures, arts, economics, and theatre just to name a few. In each event, 
Hurtzig collaborated with 100-150 experts in different fields such as film 
directors, lyricists, composers, and human-rights activists. The performance 
took place in a theatre, which Hurtzig saw as an “original location of public 
debate.”29 Participants could choose to have a half-hour conversation 
with the expert on a particular subject matter, or to listen in on others’ 
conversation through a headphone in another room. Everyone had access 
to the conversation regardless of their religious and political affiliation or 
social status. Within a defined space, the Blackmarket allowed participants 
to unravel their imagination and curiosity, and engage in a conversation 
under an open and transparent atmosphere:
The experts are seated on the left; to the right are their clients, who 
listen intently. Just before the gong sounds, they have to place a 
euro on a marked area of the table…For thirty minutes, the experts 
share their extensive knowledge, debate with their clients, give a 
singing lesson, read an aura, or carry out a thought experiment – and 
may even learn something in the process. Composer Ulrike Haage 
talks about “treating music and language with equal rights”. Harald 
Preissler, a future researcher with car company DaimlerChrysler, 
ponders “the dilemma” with his clients. Aura-reader Monika 
Bruns calmly taps into her client’s life energies, unperturbed by 
the background noise and potential eavesdroppers. Opera singer 
Burkhardt von Puttkammer expects his clients to play an active role 
in “singing in the Antarctic”: his table is studded with microphones 
so that the public can listen in. “Imitate a duck!” he exhorts. “And 
what sound does a penguin make?” Facing him, his female client 
has to breathe out heavily while emitting a high-pitched hum. 
The maestro is keen to teach her that the volume of her voice will 
increase if she uses her whole head as a resonance chamber – but 
the gong saves her from the unaccustomed challenge. Surfing 
the eight different channels on the headphones reveals scraps of 
conversation about the most diverse topics: liberating the body 
from the constraint of reproduction, the absence of utopias, why 
penguins have white stomachs…30
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 Both the Palais Royal and Hurtzig’s Blackmarket sum up the 
significance of free expression and information exchange in modern society. 
The ambivalent interplay of control and freedom of heterotopia may seem 
risky to an authoritarian government who strives for absolute power. 
Yet, from the citizen’s point of view, heterotopia can be quite positive. 
Differences and contradictions always generate new ideas and catalyst 
forces for change and transformation, by which the existing dominant 
order and social crippleness are constantly being questioned and challenged 
for bettering the society. Citizens of different social backgrounds are 
encouraged to gather together to collectively determine how their society 
are governed. Through the celebration of differences, incongruousness, 
ambivalence and informality, a more flexible, open-minded, and tolerant 
society will be formed, which will allow new ideas to mingle, evolve, and 
become possible alternatives to counterbalance the fallacy of orthodoxy. 
 The scale of China’s modernization is undoubtedly enormous 
and happening quickly. Many social issues, such as the corruption of local 
authorities, social inequality, pollution, health issues, and poverty are 
hidden within various social strata. Those problems, complex and ever-
changing as the society itself, require more than the Party’s devotion and 
patriotic spirit to resolve; state repression would only worsen the already 
complicated situation. Only through rational, enlightened debate, open 
discussion and sincere exchanges of ideas without political intimidation 
will people be able to imagine and articulate possible solutions that could 
resolve contemporary social problems. Only in a free society that tolerates 
differences will allow citizens to get emancipated from their psychological 
burdens and the dead weights of political repression; so they can develop 
their own voice and identity in politics, religion, and social affairs. Citizens 
in a heterotopic society can easily find alternative means to express, redress 
and exchange their grievances in a rather unrestrained environment. 
Heterotopia is the first step in taking down the infamous psychological 
wall, a devitalizing symbol of autocracy that has imprisoned the Chinese 
culture for centuries and that has enslaved generations of helpless Chinese 
people under a suffocating system of state censorship, repression, silencing, 
and blind nationalism.
 If we make awareness of the presence of the wall, we’ll realize 
that the wall is actually not an end but a beginning, a bridge 
that makes connection.
6.2  Blackmarket for Useful Knowledge 
and Non-Knowledge, The Hallucinated 
Community College of the Mobile Acad-




牆壁 [qiáng bì] n.  A partition wall 
 
牆 [qiáng]: a wall
[Etymology] – a plank (爿) protecting a barn (嗇). 
爿: a plank  
嗇: a barn
壁 [bì]: a partition wall / the walls of a room / a cliff
[Etymology] - a partition of earth
  辟: to take the laws to criminals / to avoid
 土: a pictograph of object rising through the land, meaning earth
城牆 [chéng qiáng] n.  A city wall
 城 [chéng]: an inner city and city wall
 [Etymology] – from earth (土) made a city.
 土: a pictograph of object rising through the land, meaning earth.
 成: a lance with an ingot, meaning to succeed.
Bronze script Large seal script
Appendix:  Chinese Etymology of Principal Terms
Bronze script Large seal script
Bronze script Large seal script
The Chinese characters have evolved over time from the earliest known pictographic forms, such as oracle 
bone script (c. 1400-1200 BC), bronze script ( c. 1100-256 BC) and seal script (c.1100-207 BC), to the 
simiplified script used today.  The purpose of etymology is to study the original meaning of words that 
embrace forgotten ancient wisdom and imagination. 
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 郭 [guō]: an outer city and city wall
 [Etymology] – a city (阝or 邑) with tall watch-tower structures (享)
阝= 邑: a pictograph of a person kneeling under a boundary.
  享: a city wall with two watch-tower structures.
 里 [lǐ]: a village; a hamlet / a traditional Chinese unit of distance (~1/3 of a mile)
[Etymology] – a measure of human settlement based on land (土) and field (田).
田: a pictograph of a field with irrigation channels.
  土: a pictograph of object rising through the earth.
國家 [guó jiā] n.  A nation; a country
 國: a nation / a country / a kingdom
[Etymology] – a kingdom surrounded by walls (囗)
囗: a pictograph of enclosure.
或: an original character for kingdom. Land (represented by 一) and people (represented by 
pictograph of a mouth囗) are protected by a weapon (戈).
 家: home / house / family
[Etymology] – a pig (豕) lives under a hut (宀) which is on stilts.
宀: a pictograph of a hut or a roof.
豕: a pictograph of a pig.
Oracle script Bronze script Seal script
Bronze script Seal script
Oracle script Bronze script Seal script
Oracle script Bronze script Large seal script
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身份 [shēn fèn] n. Identity 
身 [shēn]: a body
[Etymology] – a pictograph of the profile of a pregnant body with walking legs. 
份 [fèn]: a role / a part / a portion
[Etymology] – action of a person (亻or 人) to share (分).
亻=人: a pictograph of a human. 
分: divide (八) with a knife (刀).
藝術 [yì shù] n. Art 
藝 [yì]: art / skill/ talent




 術 [shù]: a Skill / a method 
 [Etymology] – originally an administrative district (术) at an intersection (行). 
 行: a pictograph of a street intersection.
 术: a pictograph of a top-heavy grain plant.
 
Oracle script Bronze script Seal script
Seal script
Oracle script Bronze script Seal script
Seal script
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概念 [gài niàn] n. Concept / Idea
 概 [gài] : general / overall / roughly
 
 [Etymology] – a wooden (木) instrument used to sweep off the excess at the top of a measuring tool 
when already (既) full. 
 
 木: a pictograph of wood
 既: a man turning (旡) from a bowl of rice (皀).
念 [niàn] : to think of / to chant / to mumble
[Etymology] – to keep current (今) in the heart (心).
 
 今: mouth (亼) from above speaking, meaning currently.
 心: a pictograph of an heart.
 
 
禁忌 [jìn jì] n. Taboo
 禁 [jìn] : to prohibit / to forbid / to confine
 [Etymology] – an omen (示) with a dense growth of trees (林)
 
 示: an altar which reveals the truth of god.
 林: a dense growth of trees.
忌 [jì] : jealous / to envy / to fear / a fear / a taboo
[Etymology] – a selfish (己) heart (心).
 
 己: back and forth motion of the warp string in weaving.
 心: a pictograph of an heart.
Seal script
Bronze script Seal script
Seal script
Bronze script Seal script
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Introduction
1.  Some information was crossed out by a thick black 
marker in an old picture of Nanjing found in Nanjing 
Mingguo Architecture. I later found out, what was hidden 
under the black mark was a banner saying “Chairman 
Wang is the greatest leader in the revival of China.” Wang 
was considered as a national traitor who worked for the 
Japanese government during Japan’s occupation of China. 
The banner was erected after the Japanese army won victory 
over Nanjing. The authority was probably offended by the 
banner which referred Wang as the greatest leader. To the 
communists, only Chairman Mao is the greater leader. 
2.   The original passage reads, “Magnets are both pragmatic 
and polemic in the way they turn space to the 
public advantage. They are not an end in themselves 
but encourage the continual necessity for change.” 
Hardingham, Cedric Price: Opera, 96.
3. There was a “Democracy Wall” in Beijing near Tiananmen 
Square where the people could pin up their opinions in 
form of posters. It was demolished in 1979. See Chapter II.
4. Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, 168.
Nanjing City Wall And Autocracy
1.  See Brook, The Confusion, of Pleasure, 19.
2.  Ibid., 24.
3.  Ibid., 19.
4.  See Huang, China, 171.
5.  See Yang, Nanjing Ming City Wall, 255.
6.  See Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 324.
7. See Yang, Nanjing Ming City Wall, 273.
8.  Ibid.
9.  See Rodzinski, The People’s Republic of China, 119. 
10.  Li, Red Color News Soldier, 138-139. 
11.  See Yang, Nanjing Ming City Wall, 276.
12.  Ibid., 140.
13  Ibid., 141.
14.  See Rodzinski, The People’s Republic of China, 127.
15.  See Feng, “Voices of Madness,” in China Remembers, 136.
16.  Lovell, the Great Wall, 330.
17.  Huyssen, Displacement, 14.
18.  Lovell, the Great Wall, 331.
19.  Ibid., 331.
20.  Lowenthal, “Fabricating Heritage,” History and Memory, 8.
21.  Lovell, the Great Wall, 331.
22.  See Yang, Nanjing Ming City Wall, 283.
23.  See Mitchell, “Making the Nation: The Politics of Heritage 
in Egypt,” Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage, 
212.
24.  When, “The Writing on the Wall,” in China Remembers, 
180. Wang Shan is well-known Chinese political analyst 
who participated in the 1978 Democracy Wall Movement 
and also started a magazine to publish the works that 
he and his friends put up on the wall. In 1994, under a 
German pen name, Wang published the controversial best-
seller, Viewing Chain through a Third Eye, a critique on 
the recent reforms. Despite government efforts to ban the 
book, private sales have exceeded one million copies. Even 
President Jiang Zemin praised the book before discovering 
the author’s real identity. 
25.  Ibid., 179.
25.  Lovell, the Great Wall, 328.
Nation and Boundary
1.  Cited in Liang, Notes on Ying Zao Fa Shi, 12. Written by 
Liu Xi of Eastern Han Dynasty at around AD 200, Shi 
Ming is an ancient dictionary that carries definitions of 
1,502 items.
2.  Lu, “The latency of tradition”. Cited in The End of Tradition, 
214.
3.  See Ssu-ma, The Grand Scribe’s Records, 14 & 56.
4.  Birrell, The Classic of Mountains and Seas, xvii.
5.  Ssu-ma, The Grand Scribe’s Records, 32. Both Shu Jing 
(Classics of Literature) and Shi Ji (The Grand Scribe’s 
Records) contain depiction of Yu’s political geography, the 
earliest order of the Chinese world.
6.  See Schinz, Cities in China, 2.
7.  The Han Chinese referred to the invaders from the north 
as barbarians who bore many names during the twenty-five 
centuries of their threat to China’s agricultural civilization. 
In general, the non-Han people in the west were called 
Dongyi, in the west Xirong, in the south Nanman and in 
the north Beidi. 
8.  Lovell, The Great Wall, 53. Lovell took reference of the 




9. Rodzinski, The Walled Kingdom, 42.
10. Tucker, The Great Wall of China, 8.
11. Fryer, The Great Wall of China, 58. The poem is translated  
by Arthur Waley.
12. Lovell, The Great Wall, 74.
13. Fryer, The Great Wall of China., 121.
14. Rodzinski, The Walled Kingdom, 138.
15. Lovell, The Great Wall, 178.
16. Fryer, The Great Wall of China, 136.
17. Chanda, “Sailing into Oblivion,” in Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 4.
18. Ventani, “The Admiral and Yuan,” in Asia Times Online.
19. Rodzinski, The Walled Kingdom, p152-153.
20. Lovell, The Great Wall, 271.
21. Tucker, The Great Wall of China, 5.
22.  Lovell, The Great Wall, 11
Wall of Pride and Sorrow
1.  Reber, “Berlin Wall a Powerful Influence for Intern 




1.  Su and Wang, Deathsong of the River, 13.
2.  See Bary, “Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal”, 
173. Bary’s essay borrowed from the ideas of the late-Ming 
Confucian scholar, Huang Zong Xi (Huang Tsung-Hsi), 
and his major work, A Plan for the Prince.
3.  Rong, Han Wu Di, 43.
4.  Fitzgerald, China, 414.
5.  Bary, “Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal”, in 
Chinese Thoughts and Institutions, 193.
6.  Lu Xun’s real name is Zhou Shuren. He is considered the 
father of modern Chinese literature. To avoid political 
persecution in the 1920s, Lu Xun used more than 100 
different pen names; however Lu Xun is most widely used.
7.  Lu, “A Madman’s Diary”, in Silent China, 6.
8. Ibid., 10.
9.  Ibid., 12
10.  Lu, The True Story of Ah Q,” 36.
11.  Ibid., 22.
12.  Ibid., 112, 114.
13.  Bo Yang, The Ugly Chinaman, 43.
14.  Ibid., 65.
15.  Ibid., 20.
16.  Ibid., 35.
17.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yellow_River. The 
continuous depositing of silt and centuries of dyking have 
caused the Yellow River to flow above the surrounding 
lands, making its floods the most devastating in the world. 
In 1887, the Yellow River flooded, killing one to two 
million people; in 1931, it killed one to 3.7 million. 
18.  See Su and Wang, Deathsong of the River, 186.
19.  Ibid., 187.
20.  See Su and Wang, “Sorrow and Worry”, Deathsong of the 
River, 183-201.
21.  See Bo Yang, The Ugly Chinaman, 49-51.
22.  Su and Wang, Deathsong of the River, 213.
23.  Ibid., 221-222.
24. Ibid., 9.
25.  Tu, “Deathsong of the River: Wither Chinese Culture,” The 
Deathsong of the River, 307.
26.  In 2006, Gao Xingjian, the Nobel Prize winner for 
literature discussed the peripheral identity of writers in exile 
with Philippe Forest and Kenzaburô Oé in a symposium 
for Fête du Livre in Aix-en-Provence. See Su, “bian yuan 
wei zhi de xie zuo da dao pu shi jia zhi,” Zhong Hua Tan 
Suo 19 Oct. 2007: 20-26.
27.  Su and Wang, the Deathsong of the River, 156.
Conclusion
1.  See Mook, “Martin Seligman: Learned Helplessness,” 
Classic Experiments in Psychology, 165-174.
2.  Lovell, the Great Wall, 338.
3.  Ibid., 335.
4.  Jin, “China Abandons Blog Identity Plan,” BBC News, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6682755.stm>. 




7.  “Yahoo Plea over China Rights Case,” BBC News, <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6966116.stm>. 
8.  Lovell, the Great Wall, 337.
9.  Quoted in Lovell, The Great Wall, 337.
10.  “Chinese Editor Denounces Closure,” BBC News, <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4649866.stm>.
11.  See Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 328.
12.  Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 328.
13.  Feng, “Feng Jicai on Bound Feet,” In New Ghost Old 
Dream, 126.
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I l lustrat ion Credits and Sources14.  Hetherington, The Badlands of Modernity, viii.
15.  Lin, “On Big Feet,” New Ghost, Old Dreams, 128.
16.  Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, 254.
17.  Lin, “On Big Feet,” New Ghost, Old Dreams, 128.
18. Matthews, review of “The Lives of Others,” Toronto Life, 
<http://www.torontolife.com/blogs/movie/2006/sep/13/
lives-others/>.
19.  Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 87.
20.  Groen, review of The Lives of Others, the Globe and Mail, 
R5, February 09, 2007.
21.  Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” 27.
22.  Lovell, The Great Wall, 321.
23.  Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, 252.
24. Quoted in Lovell, the Great Wall, 321. 
25.  Hetherington, “Identity Formation, Space and Social 
Centrality,” 38.
26.  Harvey, “Dialectical Utopianism,” 184.
27.  Hetherington, “Identity Formation, Space and Social 
Centrality,” 38.
28.  Hetherington, “The Palais Royal as Modernity,”  5.
29.  Scheffer, “The Mobile Academy,” <http://www.goethe.de/
ins/gb/lp/kue/the/en644270.htm>.
30. Ibid.
Walking Around the Wall:
All the photos of Nanjing are taken by Angela Chan; otherwise 
noted. 
2.1.  Nancarrow, Early China and the Wall, 26.
2.2.  Mote, The Cambridge History of China: volume 7 – The Ming 
Dynasty, 1368 – 1644, Part 1, 75. Redrawn by Angela 
Chan.
2.3.  Brook, The Confusions of Pleasure, 19.
2.4-2.5.  Brook, The Confusions of Pleasure, 19.
2.6.  Yang, Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu, 530.
2.7.  Yang, Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu, 540.
2.8.  Wang, Old Photos of Nanjing, 9.
2.9.  Schoppa, Twentieth Century China, 136.
2.10.  Schoppa, Twentieth Century China, 147.
2.11.  Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 324.
2.12.  Schoppa, Twentieth Century China, 156.
2.13.  Li, Red-Color News Soldier, 188-189.
2.14.  Yang, Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu,  560.
2.15.  Yang, Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu, 562, 564, 565.
2.16.  Li, Red-Color News Soldier, 98-99.
2.17.  Li, Red-Color News Soldier, 124.
2.18.  Li, Red-Color News Soldier, 151.
2.19.  Li, Red-Color News Soldier, 105.
2.20.  Li, Red-Color News Soldier, 101.
2.21.  Li, Red-Color News Soldier, 102.
2.22 Photo taken by Angela Chan.
2.23.  http://www.labbs.cnarticle_show.asparticleid=1650/
2.24. Ren Min Wang, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/tupian/75/
20011023/588707.html 
2.25.  Baum, Burying Mao, 75.
2.26.  Photo by Patrick Zachmann, Things As They Are, 256.
2.27.  Zi,  June Four, 17.
2.28.  Turnley, Beijing Spring, 6.
2.29.  Turnley, Beijing Spring, 175.
2.30 Zi,  June Four, 53, 89, 79.
2.31.  Zi,  June Four, 149.
3.1. Pictograph drawn by Calvin Chiu.
3.2. Pictograph drawn by Angela Chan.
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